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Public Utility Property Assessment
in Louisianat
YVETTE SHERMAN*
Before entering into a discussion of the system of ad valorem
property tax assessment of so-called "public utilities" in Louisi-
ana, it would be appropriate to sketch at this time the evolution
of our present-day Tax Commission. In this centralized body is
vested the power to assess directly the property of certain associ-
ations, individuals and corporations classifiable as public utilities.
Prior to 1898 property belonged to individuals, associations and
corporations engaged in railway, telegraph, telephone, sleeping
car and express businesses, as well as property belonging to utili-
ties other than those just enumerated,1 was not assessable by any
central board, but by the local authorities. In that year Article
226 of the Constitution provided for the creation of a State Board
of Appraisers,
"... whose duty it shall be to assess the property belonging to
corporations, associations and individuals. employed in rail-
way, telegraph, telephone, sleeping car and express business
throughout the State of Louisiana..."
Act 106 of 18982 set up the Board and provided that it should
adopt rules and procedures to determine "true and correct" as-
sessments and valuations of the property belonging to the afore-
mentioned. As an aside it might be said that we find depicted in
Act 165 of 1902 one of the many eccentric manifestations of the
workings of our legislature-a proposed amendment to the Con-
stitution of 1898, providing for the creation of a State Board of
t Acknowledgment is made to the Louisiana Tax Commission and mem-
bers of the staff for the courtesy and helpfulness in the conduct of the re-
search which forms the basis for this paper. The responsibility is that of
the writer with respect to the opinions and criticisms.
* Member of the Louisiana bar; Research Assistant, Louisiana State
University Law School.
1. By La. Act 161 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 83211 oil and gas pipe
lines, electrical transmission lines and water and gas distribution systems
were added to this list of so-called public utilities. See infra note 10.
2. Amended and reenacted by La. Act 122 of 1900 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§§ 8325, 8326].
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Appraisers, a constitutional board already in existence and func-
tioning.
In Act 12 of the Extraordinary Session of 1912 there was pro-
posed an amendment to the Constitution for the reorganization of
the system of taxation in the state of Louisiana, which included
specific provisions regarding the assessment of property belong-
ing to public service corporations,' and for the establishment of a
Tax Commission. However, the amendment, when submitted to
the people, failed of ratification.
Nevertheless, by constitutional amendment, initiated by Act
168 of 1916, the State Board of Appraisers was abolished and the
Board of State Affairs created. By Act 140 of 1916 the powers of
the State Board of Appraisers and the State Board of Equaliza-
tion4 were vested in the Board of State Affairs. Finally, by Ar-
ticle X, Section 2, of the Constitution of 1921, the Board of State
Affairs was called the Louisiana Tax Commission, which retained
all of the powers of the former body subject to the control of the
legislature.
There is no reason to examine the pertinent provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1940 relative to the problems considered
here, as the Supreme Court of Louisiana declared it to be uncon-
stitutional, apparently in its entirety, on the theory that the pro-
visions contained therein were interwoven inextricably with the
ill-starred reorganization amendment. 5
In summary, then, it may be said that the Louisiana Tax
3. This terminology is synonymous with "public utilities," and neither is
employed by La. Act 140 of 1916, Section 10, paragraph 2, as amended [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8321], which is the basic statute today for assessing property
belonging to "utilities."
4. The State Board of Equalization was vested with authority to equalize
assessments of all property in the state except as provided by Article 226 of
the Constitution of 1898, which was concerned with the authority of the State
Board of Appraisers to value property belonging to certain "utilities." La.
Act' 182 of 1906 amended and reenacted by La. Act 220 of 1910. Thus, the
powers of the State Board of Equalization need not be considered here.
5. In Title IV of La. Act 47 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 7789.26],
more commonly referred to as the Administrative Code, there is provision for
the abolition of the Louisiana Tax Commission, and in Section 1 of this Title
specific provision is made for the transfer to the Department of Revenue of
the duty or function of making "the original assessment for taxation of all
property owned by any public utility company and such other property as the
Louisiana Tax Commission has heretofore been authorized to make." Cf. this
language with the pertinent part of paragraph 2 of Section 10 in La. Act 140
of 1916 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8321]. A recent decision by the Supreme Court
of Louisiana, as yet unreported, held La. Act 47 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp.
1940) §§ 7789.6-7789.157] and La. Act 48 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941)
§§ 6631.5-6631.112] to be unconstitutional. Graham v. Jones, 198 La. 507, 3 So.
(2d) 761 (1941) held the reorganization amendment, La. Act 384 of 1940, to be
unconstitutional.
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Commission replaced the Board of State Affairs, assuming its
powers,6 and that that Board, in its turn, had been the successor
to the powers exercised by the State Board of Appraisers.7 Thus,
it is necessary to consider opinions, reports, statutory and case law
pertaining to the assessment and valuation of property belonging
to the so-called "public utilities" in the state from the time of the
creation of the State Board of Appraisers by the Constitution of
1898.
JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE POwER OF DIRECT ASSESSMENT
BY THE LOUISIANA TAX COMMISSION
Unlike the constitutional and statutory provisions regarding
the Public Service Commission and its powers,8 the general prop-
erty tax statutes regarding utilities, for the most part, seem to
avoid studiously the use of the words "public utilities" or "public
service corporations." Nowhere is there an express statutory or
constitutional provision to the effect that the property of all pub-
6. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 2. State ex rel. Jefferson Island Salt Mine
Co. v. Landry, 170 La. 251, 127 So. 618 (1930); Southern Amusement Co. v.
City of Jennings, 180 La. 800, 157 So. 720 (1934).
7. La. Act 140 of 1916, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8313]. Director General
of Railways v. Hughes, Tax Collector, 157 La. 8, 101 So. 728 (1924). A ruling
by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in the unreported case of Orleans-Kenner
Electric Railway Co. v. State Board of Appraisers, Supreme Court Docket No.
22,378 (1917) authorized the Board of State Affairs to substitute for the State
Board of Appraisers. This ruling is cited In the subsequent annual reports by
the Board of State Affairs as authority for exercising powers formerly vested
in the State Board of Appraisers.
8. The Public Service Commission was formerly called the Railroad Com-
mission, and its regulatory powers were limited to certain specific businesses.
La. Const. of 1898, Art. 283. But in La. Const. of 1921, Art. VI, § 4, there Is in
addition to specific categories the broad language "and other public utilities."
For similar language see La. Act 19 of 1934 (2 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939)§§ 7917.1-7917.2] and La. Act 20 of 1934 (2 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7917.3-
7917.7]; La. Act 108 of 1921 (E.S.) as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7918].
9. La. Const. of 1898, Art. 226, sets out specifically the types of business
to be assessed directly by the State Board of Appraisers. La. Const. of 1913,
Art. 226, merely creates the Board of State Affairs and La. Const. of 1921,
Art. X, § 2 states that the latter board "hereafter shall be called the Louisiana
Tax Commission."
The argument has been advanced to the effect that Section 10 of Act 140
of 1916 gives to the Tax Commission authority to assess or value all property
in the state for state purposes and that these valuations are to be accepted
as final for local purposes. Further, that this means that the Commission has
authority to value all property in the state, whether it be public utility or
other property. If this argument is accepted it renders nugatory the subse-
quent discussion. However, while the writer admits that the ultimate au-
thority to assess all property in the state is vested in the Commission, the
preliminary valuations are within the province of the local assessors subject
to final determination by the Tax Commission. But the local assessors are
concerned in no way with the valuation or assessment of the so-called public
utility properties. If we accept the interpretation, we must Ignore all of the
statutory provisions relative to the duties and powers of the local assessors.
Too, it is obvious that this Interpretation has not been accepted else why has
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lic utilities is assessable directly by the Louisiana Tax Commis-
sion. Yet, since the creation of the State Board of Appraisers, this
is a rule substantiated by the language of certain authorities. 0
One or two isolated statutes on property assessment and taxa-
tion1 speak of the public service corporations in the state, but the
basic or pivotal statute granting the Louisiana Tax Commission
authority to initiate the assessment of property belonging to the
so-called public utilities fails to use this all-embracive language.
Rather does this statute, Act 140 of 1916, Section 10, paragraph 2,12
list categorically those businesses which are to be assessed or
valued directly by the Louisiana Tax Commission. While all of
these can be classified as public service companies, and are so
classified by the Louisiana Tax Commission, 8 there is no recog-
nition given the existence of public utilities other than those spe-
the legislature seen fit to amend the act in 1938, adding to the list of the so-
called public utilities, if the Commission were vested already with the power
to value such property directly. Art X, § 12 of the Constitution of 1921,
substantiates our argument, for a fair interpretation of this section would
be that the local assessors value and list all real estate and then submit these
valuations to the Louisiana Tax Commission. It is significant that this inter-
pretation was flatly rejected in G. R. McKinney Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commis-
sion, 150 So. 452 (La. App. 1933).
10. Report of Louisiana Board of State Affairs (1918-1920) in the legisla-
tive recommendations declares "As a matter of fact, the valuation and assess-
ment of all public service corporations is directly under the control of this
Board." In its report to the Constitutional Convention of 1921, the Assessment
and Taxation Commission, created by La. Act 222 of 1920, stated "The Consti-
tution of 1898 created a State Board of Appraisers whose duty it was to value
and assess the property of all public service corporations. The local assessors
had no authority after the creation of the Board of Appraisers to value or
assess property of any public service corporation."
11. See La. Act 163 of 1924 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8379] which speaks of
publio utility bonds; First National Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 175
La. 119, 143 So. 23 (1932) stated that this act Is so palpably unconstitutional
that it has never been enforced. La. Act 120 of 1918 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§§ 8419-8422]. This possibly is superseded by Act 18 of 1934 (2 E.S.) [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8324.1-8324.9]. Cf. La. Act 26 of 1935 (2 E.S.), La. Act 116 of
1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) §§ 8805.1-8805.181 providing for the so-called
public utilities license tax.
12. As amended and reenacted by La. Act 211 of 1918, La. Act 161 of 1938,
and La. Act 236 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8321].
13. Louisiana Tax Commission, Assessment Suggestions to Assessors and
Police Juries (Feb. 1942) Pt. 4, p. 29. See Bonbright, Public Utilities and
National Powers (1940) 2-3: "Most of these utilities fall into one of two major
classes (1) the various transportation agencies; and (2) the plants supplying
some form of service through a permanent physical connection with the
customer's premises." The author then outlines the characteristics that dis-
tinguish utilities from other forms of businesses:
I. Special privileges not granted to men engaged in so-called private
business are (a) eminent domain, (b) permission to use streets, et cetera for
pipes, rails, et cetera, (c) marked degree of protection from encroachment
on their territories by rival companies or rival public plants (until recently,
at least).
II. But they must (a) render adequate service, (b) at reasonable rates,
(c) without unjust discrimination among actual or potential customers.
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cifically enumerated or to the possibility that new types of public
utilities might come into existence."
If, then, a business, declared by statute to be a public utility,
cannot be forced into one of the categories set out by this stat-
ute,15 it follows that the assessment of its property is not within
the purview of the section providing for direct assessment by the
Louisiana Tax Commission. Although one must read all statutes
or sections of statutes which are in pari materia. with this act, un-
til there is an amendment to the act itself or until there is some
constitutional provision regarding the matter, it is difficult to see
how it can be said that the Louisiana Tax Commission has the
power to assess directly the property belonging to all public util-
ities. For it cannot be disputed that the Louisiana Tax Commis-
sion is made a body of assessors by Act 140 of 1916, Section 10,
paragraph 2, with regard to certain "public utilities" and, as such,
is like other assessors in the state who are "statute officers" and
"the statutes of the State levying taxes, and directing assessment
of the objects liable to taxation, and defining the duties of asses-
sors, are at once the source and measure of the authority of those
officers." 16 (Italics supplied.)
Before considering individually each category as set out in
what might be called the direct assessment clause of Act 140 of
1916,17 both as regards the administrative duties or functions of
the Louisiana Tax Commission and its methods of assessing the
property falling into such categories, let us note that by statutory
enactment municipalities and parishes have been given the power
to own, operate, lease, construct, et cetera, certain utilities which
14. Toll bridges, toll roads, public buses, steamship lines, radio broad-
casting and television companies have been classified as public utilities.
Bonbright, .op. cit. supra note 13, at 2. For purposes of the two per cent.
public utilities license tax, "motor bus lines" and "boat or pocket lines" are
declared public utilities. La. Act 26 of 1935 (2 E.S.), § 4, as amended and
reenacted by La. Act 31 of 1935 (4 E.S.), La. Act 182 of 1938 [Dart's Stats.
(Supp. 1941) § 8805.4]. But it is obvious immediately that these "public
utilities" are without the scope of the pertinent part of Section 10, paragraph
2, of Act 140 of 1916, as amended and reenacted [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8321],
But La. Act 10 of 1915 (E.g.) declaring sugar refineries to be public
utilities was held to be unconstitutional in McFarland, Supervisor of Public
Accounts of Louisiana v. American Sugar Refining Company, 241 U.S. 79,
36 S.Ct. 498, 60 L.Ed. 899 (1916).
15. As especially amended and reenacted by La. Act 161 of 1938 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8321].
16. This language was that of the court in State ex rel. La. Imp. Co. v.
Board of Assessors, 111 La. 982, 36 So. 91 (1902), and followed in Louisiana
and A. R. Co. v. Bailey, 115 La. 929, 40 So. 358 (1905). Such officers are created
by the constitution, but at the same time they are dependent upon statutes
which elaborate upon their powers within the constitutional limitations.
17. Supra note 15.
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have been interpreted as falling within the scope of the direct
assessment clause. 8 Too, municipal corporations have been given
the right to expropriate certain privately owned utilities when
deemed necessary for the public interest.19 The Constitution of
1921, in Article X, Section 4, paragraph 1, provides that all public
property is exempt from taxation, and this comprehends an elec-
tric lighting plant, water-works, et cetera, owned by a local unit
of government. 20 It has been held that the property belonging to
an electric lighting and water plant and distribution system,
owned and operated by a municipality, continued to be tax ex-
empt for the year in which it was sold to a private corporation,
when it belonged to the municipality on tax day, that is, January
1st, of that year.2 1 Along the same line of reasoning, property ac-
quired after January 1st of the year, for which taxes are assessed,
by a person, association or corporation whose property is exempt
from taxation, is not exempt for that year, the status of such
property being determinable as of January 1st. 2  When asked
whether municipalities were liable for taxes on certain utilities
owned and operated by them, the Attorney General refused to
answer, giving as his reason the fact that the Auditor of Public
Accounts had decreed they were, probably on the ground that the
property was owned previously by a private individual in the
same year for which the taxes were demanded. 23
Since the state and its political subdivisions cannot tax such
publicly-owned property, we are concerned here only with pri-
18. La. Act 248 of 1912 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5969-5975]; La. Act 34 of
1914 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5969-5970]; La. Act 128 of 1918 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 7948-7953]; La. Act 70 of 1921 (E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7955-
7960]; La. Act 53 of 1924 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7954]; La. Act 83 of 1926
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7970-7976]; La. Act 247 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 7954]; La. Act 31 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6011.1-6011.5]; La. Act 49 of
1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 7959.1-7959.8]; La. Act 376 of 1938 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 7979.1-7979.14].
19. La. Act 111 of 1900 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 7939-7947].
20. The test is ownership and not the use of the property. Thus, if a
local unit of government leases the property to a private person, association
or corporation, such property should be tax exempt.
21. Gulf Public Service Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 167 La. 757,
120 So. 286 (1929). See also New Orleans Bank & Trust Co. v. City of New
Orleans, 176 La. 946, 147 So. 42 (1933).
22. Y.M.C.A. v. City of New Orleans, 11 La. App. 360 (1929). Cf. Citizen's
Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Assessors, 129 La. 1091, 57 So. 528 (1912). But
cf. Gachet v. New Orleans, 52 La. Ann. 814, 27 So. 348 (1900). Here a piece of
land passed to public ownership after January 1 of the year for which taxes
were demanded, and the court held such property tax exempt on the ground
that it was publicly owned before taxes were due and exigible. Cf. also
Opinions of Attorney General (1934-36) 1164; (1932-34) 779, 892. Property is
tax exempt which is acquired by the United States after January 1, but
before the assessment is made, or before the assessment rolls are filed.
23. Opinions of Attorney General (1918-1920) 758.
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vately-owned utilities that fall within the categories of the direct
assessment clause. But, for jurisdictional purposes, at least, we
must determine whether the Louisiana Tax Commission is called
upon to act in an administrative capacity-to value the tax-
exempt property for listing on the assessment rolls. The Consti-
tution provides that all real estate, taxable as well as exempt,
must be assessed for listing purposes2 and one case held that it
was the duty of the State Board of Appraisers to make a valua-
tion of all of the property employed in the railway business, even
though some was ascertained to be exempt from taxation.25 Such
property was valued subsequently by the State Board of Ap-
praisers as the decision directed.2
While the constitutional provision regarding the assessment
of real estate, taxable as well as exempt, undoubtedly covers
real estate owned by the tax-exempt utilities, there is no statu-
tory or constitutional provision which envisages listing on the
assessment rolls property other than real estate belonging to the
tax-exempt utilities.2 T The Tax Commission does not value the
personal property belonging to these utilities, but the real estate
is valued. However, despite the fact that tax-exempt realty is
required to be listed on the assessment rolls, the writer has been
told that, practically, this is not done in all parishes; that the list-
ing of this property on the assessment rolls is a matter relegated
to the discretion of the parish authorities. 28
Article 226 of the Constitution of 1898 divested the local as-
sessors of the power to assess the property of railway, telephone,
24. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 12. La. Act 109 of 1921, § 3 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 8294].
25. Louisiana & A. R. Co. v. Bailey, Tax Collector, 115 La. 929, 40 So.
358 (1905).
26. Report of the State Board of Appraisers, 1906: "Prior to the present
year the Board of Appraisers made no evaluation of those railways or parts
of railways which are exempt from taxation under the provision of the Con-
stitution of 1898 and the amendment of 1904. This was because the Board
felt that its duty was limited to 'assessing for taxation' certain property
named in the law creating the Board. On December 4th, 1904, however, the
State Supreme Court held in the case of the Louisiana and Arkansas Railway
Co. v. Bailey, Tax Collector of Winn Parish, that it was the duty of the
Board to make a valuation of all of the property employed in the railway
business, even though it was ascertained to be exempt from taxation."
Later reports show that such property was valued subsequently.
27. La. Act 140 of 1916, § 10, paragraph 2, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 8321] requires the Louisiana Tax Commission to assess the so-called utillites
"for all purposes." The writer suggests that this could be Interpreted to cover
assessment for listing purposes where property is exempt. See for an inter-
pretation of the quoted language Opinions of the Attorney General (1916-
1918) 307 and 316. See also Louisiana Tax Commission Assessment Sugges-
tions to the Assessors and Police Juries (Feb. 1942) Pt. 4, p. 29.
28. See Opinions of Attorney General (1934-1936) 1295 and 1310.
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telegraph, sleeping car and express businesses, and vested it in a
centralized body, wherein it has remained.29 Subsequent statutes
elaborated upon this power but the most important provisions,
from an administrative point of view, are to be found in Act 140
of 1916. The concept of "public utility business" has been en-
larged by way of statutory amendment, making the pertinent
part of Section 10, paragraph 2, of the act read as follows:
".. . the actual cash valuation and assessment of gas and oil
pipe lines, electrical transmission lines, water and gas distribu-
tion systems, railway, telegraph, telephone, sleeping car and
express business throughout the State of Louisiana, shall be
fixed and assessed by this Board (Louisiana Tax Commission)
for all purposes."3 0
This broad categoric language, if taken at face value, does
not imply, necessarily, that the property to be so assessed should
be, characteristically or distinctively, public utility property; nor
are the administrative authorities in accord in their interpreta-
tion of this language. Usually this section is given a narrow in-
terpretation, which presupposes the presence of elements essen-
tial to classifying the different kinds of "business" as public utili-
ties or public service corporations;3 1 that each "business" is com-
plete within itself and not just another adjunct or incident to an-
other business. Thus, railway property belonging to a sawmill
concern and used solely for logging purposes has been said to be
assessable by the local authorities and not directly by the Com-
mission or its predecessors.3 2 If railway cars belonging to a sugar
refinery are used only as a plant facility and not as common car-
riers, they are assessable by the local authorities. But if a rail-
way, owned by a lumber company and used by it as a plant fa-
cility, is at the same time leased to an operating railway, it is
assessable directly by the Board of State Affairs (Louisiana Tax
Commission) .34 Then, too, private telephone lines, erected by per-
29. This centralized body is now called the Louisiana Tax Commission.
La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 2.
30. La. Act 161 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8321] amended and re-
enacted the direct assessment clause by adding the first three categories as
listed.
31. See Southern Amusement Co. v. City of Jennings, 180 La. 800, 811, 157
So. 720, 723 (1934).
32. Opinions of Attorney General (1908-1910) 319; Opinions of Attorney
General (1904-1906) 229. In its Suggestions to Assessors for all years the
Louisiana Tax Commission declares that the local assessors must assess log-
ging railways.
33. Opinions of Attorney General (1914-1916) 238.
34. Opinions of Attorney General (1916-1918) 306.
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sons for their own convenience and for the use of which no tolls
are charged, are assessed by the local authorities. Likewise tele-
phone cooperatives are assessed locally. 5
On the other hand, however, the writer was told that the
Tax Commission initiated the assessment of a logging railroad
because it was a standard gauge railroad,36 despite the foregoing
authority to the contrary. We find still another incongruity in the
fact that the Commission values directly the rolling stock be-
longing to such taxpayers, as, for instance, the Cloverland Dairy
in New Orleans, regardless of the fact that this property is not
used for purposes of common carriage, but only to facilitate the
dairy business. Too, the Commission initiates the assessment of
ice plants belonging to those utilities it considers to be within its
particular jurisdiction.37 What is the authority for these under-
takings? It is purely a matter of expediency, and the administra-
tive authorities frankly state that if such "authority" were ever
questioned, the "power" to assess such property originally would
be relinquished immediately to the local assessors.
When the State Board of Appraisers was created, it was ves-
ted expressly with the power to assess property belonging to and
employed in the conduct of certain businesses. 8 The Attorney
General has stated, with respect to the extent of this power, that
"property belonging to corporations, associations and individ-
uals, not used or employed in railway [et cetera] business
should be assessed by the several local assessors and your
Board should only assess such property as is employed or used
in the business."39
Here the Attorney General states that the word "employed," as
used in the statutory provision, which sets up the authority of the
35. Louisiana Tax Commission, Suggestions to Assessors (Feb. 1942) 26.
The writer was told by the Tax Commission that electric cooperatives
were assessed locally. But see La. Act 266 of 1940, Section 24 [Dart's Stats.
(Supp. 1941) 1305.24] which provides that the properties of such cooperatives
Is to be valued by the assessing authorities for state purposes at ten per cent
of actual value.
36. This was the Ouachita & N.W. Ry. which recently abandoned its
track, having been given permission to do so by the Public Service Commis-
sion.
37. Utility Schedule No. 7 (6 M 1-42 11560) of the annual reports of the
Tax Commission by electric, gas and water "utilities" requires them to return
as property the "ice machinery; and all other machinery and equipment in-
cidental to the operation of your electric, gas or water system."
38. La. Const. of 1898, Art. 226. La. Act 106 of 1898, as amended and re-
enacted by La. Act 122 of 1900 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8325-8329].
39. Opinions of Attorney General (1898-1900) 74. But cf. Opinions of At-
torney General (1916-1918) 311, at 312, 313.
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board to assess directly property belonging to railway, telephone,
telegraph, sleeping car and express businesses cannot mean "en-
gaged" but means "used."
Although the word "employed" is not carried over into the
pertinent part of Act 140 of 1916;40 the foregoing, in the main, sub-
stantiates the viewpoint of the authorities today. As an example,
we may advert to the fact that the Tax Commission considers it-
self without jurisdiction to assess non-operative realty belonging
to a railroad. Whether the change in verbiage in the act was in-
tended to affect jurisdiction the writer is unable to say. However,
the administrative authorities apparently have not considered
this omission of language as affecting the accepted jurisdictional
limitations of the power of original or direct assessment. In fact,
jurisdiction over property not used in a "public utility" business
has been assumed, the administrative authorities say, only for the
purpose of expediting assessments.
Disregarding what is done practically, the logical conclusions
would seem to be that if the generic property is used solely to
facilitate a business not classifiable as a public utility, such prop-
erty should not be assessed directly by the Louisiana Tax Com-
mission, but by the local assessors, in line with the assessment of
other property in the state.4 1 It is equally true that any property
belonging to one of the businesses falling within the categories
but not used or employed in the conduct of the business proper,
should be assessed locally. To conclude, where property belong-
ing to one of the kinds of business enumerated in the act, is, of it-
self, utility property, to determine jurisdiction to assess, the test
of being "used" or being merely an adjunct or incident to the bus-
iness would be inapplicable, as such property, having elements
necessary for classification as public utility property, should be
considered to be within the province of the Tax Commission to
assess directly.
Although it is impossible to state definitively that the term-
inology "public utility" or "public service" has been read into the
direct assessment clause of Act 140 of 1916, as a modification of
the categories, what authority there is on the subject and the
40. As amended and reenacted supra note 12.
41. In elaboration upon this statement we might say that all taxable
property, not falling within what we have termed the direct assessment
clause of Section 10, paragraph 2, of Act 140 of 1916, as amended and re-
enacted, is assessed by the parish assessors with a kind of supervisory juris-
diction in the Louisiana Tax Commission over such assessments. Section 10
of Act 140 of 1916 as amended and re-enacted (Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8321).
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actual administration by the Tax Commission would seem to sub-
stantiate the premise.4 2 However, we might examine, for the mo-
ment, the concept "business" before proceeding to a special con-
sideration of the categories in an effort to determine criteria by
which they are adjudged public utilities and, as such, within the
jurisdiction of the Louisiana Tax Commission to assess directly.
"Business," as used in the pertinent part of Act 140 of 1916, Sec-
tion 10, paragraph 2, has been translated into terms of property
for purposes of ad valorem taxation. But it has not been inter-
preted to comprehend such intangible elements as good will, pos-
sible future earnings, et cetera. In some of the annual reports
filed by the utilities with the Commission, information is elicited
under a column titled "Intangibles."43 Certainly this language
might include "good will" and the like, but at the same time the
utility of such a column is negligible, for the information sought
is for purposes of formulating financial statements and not for
purposes of reporting property. In theory as well as practice the
administrative authorities do not consider good will, et cetera, to
be elements of property taxable under the ad valorem property
tax statutes of the state. If "good will" is concededly an element
of property and is not taxed, the constitutionality of this "exemp-
tion" may be questioned." The subsequent remarks, of necessity,
will not attempt to cope with this kind of problem except in the
more obvious instances, for we feel that it is essential to discuss
primarily the two major problems confronting us, namely, juris-
diction to assess and methods or elements in the methods used for
determining the "actual cash value" of utility property, and that
it is equally necessary to avoid a deviation wherever possible.
It would be well to bear in mind throughout the following
discussion the fact that in the direct assessment clause the first
three categories are concrete. They refer to particular property.
Only the last five categories are modified by the term "business,"
which implies that all property used in the conduct of the "bus-
iness" should be assessed directly by the Commission. This
clumsy phraseology is inexcusible, for it allows for specious inter-
pretation by the authorities and justifiable criticism by the com-
mentator.
Nowhere in the field of ad valorem property taxation is the
42. Louisiana Tax Commission, Suggestions to Assessors and Police Juries
(Feb. 1942) 29.
43. Annual Report of Telephone and Telegraph Companies, Financial
Statement, Schedule No. 2 (500 1-42 11330).
44. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 4.
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terminology "public utilities" adequately defined. Some license
tax statutes have declared certain enterprises falling within the
categories of the direct assessment clause to be public utilities,
with a formulation of criteria by which the utilities may be dis-
tinguished from organizations similar to but not engaged in util-
ity business.4 5 However, there is no gainsaying but that in the
field of ad valorem property assessment and taxation of public
utilities there should have been developed a sui generis body of
law. However, since this is not the case, inadequacy of definition
forces us to search elsewhere to discover standards by which we
are able to determine what are public utilities.
Gas and Oil Pipe Lines
In its "Suggestions to Assessors and Parish Boards of Equali-
zation," the Louisiana Tax Commission in 1939, at page 23, de-
clared:
"Under the provisions of Act 161 of 1938, the Louisiana Tax
Commission is authorized and empowered to assess directly
gas and oil pipe lines. For purposes of administration that
statute has been interpreted to mean 'common carrier' lines.
All property falling under this classification, as well as all
properties used and connected therewith, both real and per-
sonal, will be assessed by the Tax Commission beginning with
the calendar year 1939. When the assessments have been com-
pleted same will be certified to the various assessors through-
out the State in a manner similar to certification of other Pub-
lic Service valuation."
Further,
"There are in existence in this State oil and gas pipe lines
which are not classified as 'common carrier' lines and which
will be assessed by the local taxing authorities."
Since the Tax Commission admits searching through the rec-
ords of the Public Service Commission to discover utilities sup-
posedly within its jurisdiction to assess directly, the writer feels
justified in resorting to the statutes in the field of rate regulation
of public utilities by the Public Service Commission in quest of
criteria for measuring the categorical "gas and oil pipe lines" of
the direct assessment clause. The statutes to be considered here
do not use the terminology "public utilities," "public service" or
45. La. Act 26 of 1935 (2 E.S.) § 4, as amended and re-enacted by La. Act
81 of 1935 (4 E.S.), La. Acts 182 and 272 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941)§ 8805.4].
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"quasi public" corporations; rather, they set standards for the de-
termination of "common carrier" pipe lines." Thus, Act 36 of 1906
provides that "all pipe lines through which gases, oil or other
liquids are conveyed from one point in the State to another point
in the State, for a consideration, are hereby declared to be com-
mon carriers," and, as such, are subject to regulation by the Rail-
road Commission of Louisiana.47 Another act of 1906, namely, No.
39, gives to all corporations, domestic and foreign, rights of expro-
priation for building and constructing pipe lines for the transpor-
tation of oil and gas or either. But, before such rights may be
exercised, the corporation must file with the Secretary of State a
resolution by its Board of Directors, duly certified under its cor-
porate seal, consenting and agreeing that the corporation shall
become a common carrier of oil and gas, or either, that is, it must
consent to transport the product for which it has declared itself a
common carrier for all persons and corporations up to the ca-
pacity of its pipe lines without discrimination. Act 76 of 1920
amended Act 36 of 1906 only with regard to crude petroleum pipe
lines, declaring these to be "common carriers," in the following
language:
".. . this Act shall include all persons, firms or corporations
engaged in the transportation of crude petroleum as 'common
carriers' for hire, or upon which proper showing, may be le-
gally held to be 'common carriers' from the nature of the
business conducted or from the manner in which such business
is carried on."
Rights of expropriation are given such persons, firms and corpora-
tions without any preliminary requirement of a corporate resolu-
tion (or declaration of any kind), as provided in Act 39 of 1906.
The cases interpreting the foregoing statutes, for the most
part, deal with the right of the Public Service Commission to in-
vestigate pipe line businesses in order to discover whether they
fall within its jurisdiction to regulate.48 For our purposes, these
46. The statutes listed in supra note 45 do not state expressly that the
"pipe lines" comprehended by them are "common carriers," while the stat-
utes considered in the text, relating to the powers of the Public Service
Commission, use the terminology "common carriers."
47. The Railroad Commission was superseded by the Louisiana Public
Service Commission. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VI, § 9.
48. The power of the Public Service Commission to investigate such a
business for regulatory purposes is given by statutes other than those cited in
this paper. But the latter are considered in the following cases: Standard
Oil Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 154 La. 557, 97 So. 859 (1923);
Interstate Natural Gas Co., Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 33
F. Supp. 50, 34 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. La. 1940).
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cases are of some material value because of the fact that they are
wont to use the terms "common carriers" and "public utilities"
synonymously.49 By way of correlation, this seems to be the posi-
tion adopted by the Louisiana Tax Commission with regard to gas
and oil pipe lines.
The criteria, then, elucidated in the foregoing acts give sub-
stance to the interpretation of Act 161 of 1938 by the Commission,
in that they provide the means through which we are able to
judge whether a gas and oil pipe line falls within the scope of the
direct assessment clause. Although there is no absolute veracity
in a statement to the effect that all common carriers are public
utilities, still it is clearly correct to state that some common car-
riers might be classified as public utilities. If a pipe line "busi-
ness" holds itself out to the public for hire in the transportation
of oil or gas in return for which it is the recipient of certain rights
as well as certain regulatory measures not accorded everyone, it
has labelled itself a public servant, in effect, or to put it in the
terminology of this paper, a public utility. So the interpretation
given Act 161 of 1938 by the Louisiana Tax Commission regarding
oil and gas pipe lines is not incongruous with a major premise
that the power of direct assessment by that body is exercised only
with regard to that type of "business" classifiable as a public
utility.
The direct assessment clause of Act 140 of 1916 apparently
comprehends both classes of public utilities as defined by Bon-
bright, 0 (1) the various transportation agencies and (2) the
plants supplying some form of service through a permanent phy-
sical connection with the customer's premises. The writer sug-
gests, in the light of previous discussion, that insofar as the law
of this state is concerned, the former class of public utilities
should be defined by applying the standards which measure "com-
mon carriers." For there would be no logic in an interpretation
which dictated that only some of the transportation businesses
falling within the categories of the clause be measured in terms
of common carriers. So, in order to achieve some sort of reason-
49. See Interstate Natural Gas Co., Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Com-
mission, 33 F. Supp. 50, 34 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. La. 1940). Cf. The Pipe Line
Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 34 S. Ct. 956, 58 L.Ed. 1459 (1914). A federal statute pro-
viding for the regulation of pipe lines in interstate commerce required classi-
fication as common carriers as the intermediate step to classification as pub-
lic utilities. It was held that the statute applied where the pipe lines were
carriers of what was equivalent to their own oil, by virtue of the fact that
the original owners agreed, by contract, to sell at prices set by the pipe line
companies.
50. Supra note 13.
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able pattern, an interpretation of the categories in terms of com-
mon carriers will be utilized wherever applicable.
Some of the statutes defining or setting up criteria for deter-
mining common carriers are confusing and apparently irreconcil-
able with the actual administration by the authorities. Before
proceeding to a consideration of these we might state that, rela-
tively speaking, Act 39 of 1906 is not such a statute; it does not
provide a definitive criterion to be considered in determining
whether gas and oil pipe lines are common carriers. By this act
all corporations comprehended therein, with the exception of
those engaged in the transportation of crude petroleum, must file
a corporate resolution with the Secretary of State to the effect
that they desire classification as common carriers in order to exer-
cise rights of expropriation. But the filing of this resolution is,
by the very language of this statute, a condition precedent only
for the purpose of acquiring these rights and does not mean that,
unless this resolution is filed, the pipe line company is not a com-
mon carrier. It is expressly stated by Act 36 of 1906, as amended,"
that the test for ascertaining which are common carrier pipe lines
is to determine whether they are employed for the purpose of
transporting oil or gas from one point in the state to another.
Then we can conclude that some gas and oil pipe lines may be
common carriers and are assessed directly by the Commission,
albeit these cannot exercise rights of expropriation, for the laying
of their pipes."
It must be admitted that the attempted correlation of the law
applicable to the assessment of utilities with the rate regulation
statutes breaks down when we consider pipe lines which are
purely interstate in character. By the very language of these
statutes the Public Service Commission has no jurisdiction to
regulate this type of pipe line.63 However, for the purpose of this
paper, this collapse of analogous reasoning seems unimportant at
this point, for surely no one can deny that there is as much, if
not more, justification for direct assessment, by a centralized
body, of an interstate business as is contemplated here. It has
been held that a state could levy a property tax on pipe lines
having a situs within the state, although such pipe lines were
51. La. Act 76 of 1920 amended Act 36 of 1906 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§
7980-7997].
52. There is nothing in the acts which would preclude the purchase of
rights of way other than by exercising rights of expropriation and the writer
suggests that these pipe lines may be common carriers nonetheless.
53. La. Act 36 of 1906, § 1, as amended by La. Act 76 of 1920, § 2 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 7980].
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used in interstate commerce." Like the intrastate pipe line here-
tofore discussed, these interstate lines should have the attributes
necessary for classification as common carriers in accordance with
the Commission's intepretation of the category "gas and oil pipe
lines." Therefore it would seem that the utilization of the test
previously set forth, for determining whether intrastate pipe lines
are common carriers, would be in order here.
Electrical Transmission Lines
The direct assessment clause sets forth as the next category
''electrical transmission lines." The administrative authorities
consider this category to comprehend electricity producing plants
and distribution systems, whose business is purely local in nature,
i.e., falling within the second class of utilities defined by Bon-
bright,55 and selling its own electricity to customers with whose
premises it maintains some sort of permanent connection. Ade-
quate provision has been made by statute for the regulation by
the Public Service Commission, of such utilities, precisely de-
scribed as "gas, electric light, heat, power, water-works or other
local public utility."5 But the same is not true of the statutes de-
fining the jurisdiction of the Tax Commission or its predecessors
with regard to the power of initiating the assessments of property
belonging to these utilities. It is obvious from the outset that an
assertion to the effect that the direct assessment clause compre-
hends all local utilities is nothing but a spurious interpretation
of language. The cardinal point to be made here is that we cannot
fail to question any interpretation which states or even assumes
that the language "electrical transmission lines" refers to more
than that property necessary to and used or connected with the
transmission or distribution of electricity, as wires, poles, et cetera.
Certainly an electricity producing plant is not the same as "elec-
trical transmission lines" or even part of that category. The latter
are merely the means through which electricity is conveyed to
the consumer. If the Louisiana Tax Commission assumes that it
has no authority to value property used for producing oil and is
confined to assessing directly only the oil pipe lines and the prop-
erty immediately incident thereto, it seems only logical to limit
the category "electrical transmission lines" in the same way. In
other words, it would seem that the Tax Commission transcends
54. Miller County Highway & Bridge Dist. v. Standard Pipe Line Co., 19
F. (2d) 3 (C.C.A. 8th, 1927), reversed on other grounds in 277 U.S. 160, 48 S. Ct.
441, 72 L.Ed. 831, 58 A.L.R. 126 (1928).
55. Supra note 13.
56. La. Act 19 of 1934 (2 E.S.) § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7917.1].
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its authority in assessing directly property other than that neces-
sary to the transmission or even the local distribution of elec-
tricity.
The purport of the phrase "electrical transmission lines" is
carriage or distribution of electricity. While there is logic in the
Attorney General's opinion which stated that electricity is not
such a material substance as to be classified as property and so
assessed,7 the fact remains that it is conveyed to the consumer in
a manner similar to that employed in the carriage of oil or gas.
Unlike its interpretation of the category "gas and oil pipe lines"
the Commission has not limited this category to a comprehension
of the electrical transmission lines engaged in business as common
carriers. The writer doubts whether many of the high tension
electrical transmission lines running throughout the state are
common carriers of electricity. If any are used for such a purpose,
it is essential that we consider them, and presumably some must
be by virtue of the fact that there are statutes concerned with
common carrier hydro-electric transmission line companies.
The criteria for measuring which hydro-electric transmission
lines are common carriers may be found in Act 268 of 1916 which
deals with domestic corporations." Unlike Act 39 of 1906, relating
to gas and oil pipe lines, the language of Section 7 of the former
statute is to the effect "That no such corporation shall have the
power to exercise any right of expropriation herein conferred,
and [italics supplied] no such corporation shall be considered a
common carrier" until it shall have filed with the Secretary of
State, the same type of resolution required of oil and gas pipe
line companies. But by this section it would seem that the resolu-
tion is a condition precedent to classification as a common carrier,
and not merely to the exercise of rights of expropriation.
Act 110 of 1924, 59 as amended and reenacted, is pertinent to the
present discussion, for it provides that corporations, whether do-
mestic or foreign, organized for the purpose of developing and
transmitting electricity, are given rights of expropriation; but
they must construct, operate and maintain the buildings, trans-
mission lines, et cetera, so as not to be dangerous to persons or
property, or to interfere with the wires of other wire-using com-
57. Opinions of Attorney General (1932-1934) 830.
58. La. Act 268 of 1916 supersedes La. Act 157 of 1914 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§§ 2869-2876]. Note the fact that these statutes do not provide for regulation
by the Railroad Commission (Louisiana Public Service Commission).
59. La. Act 156 of 1926 amended La. Act 110 of 1924 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 2880].
[Vol. IV
1942] PUBLIC UTILITY PROPERTY ASSESSMENT 519
panies. This act is not predicated upon the fulfillment of the con-
dition precedent, namely, the filing of a corporate resolution with
the Secretary of State, declaring that such corporation seeks clas-
sification as a common carrier. But at the same time there is
nothing in this act which would exclude or dispense, with the
necessity that hydro-electric transmission line companies fulfill
the condition before rights of expropriation are exercised. While
the right of expropriation is not an ultimate test for determining
which businesses are common carriers or public utilities, it is a
characteristic of certain types of organizations discussed in this
paper.6 0
The foregoing statutory provisions, then, define only hydro-
electrical transmission lines in terms of common carriers, but
there is nothing in the language of these acts which would require
that all electrical transmission lines or even hydro-electric trans-
mission lines be deemed common carriers in order to fall within
the scope of the direct assessment clause. In fact there has never
been a case nor an administrative interpretation limiting in any
way the categorical "electrical transmission lines." So, it would
make no difference insofar as concerns the power of the Tax Com-
mission to assess directly "electrical transmission lines" that none
fulfills the qualifications of common carriers. Certainly it should
suffice that they are public utility properties of one type or an-
other.
Applying the interpretation of the direct assessment clause
set out earlier in this paper, if any of these high tension electrical
transmission lines are used solely as an adjunct of a business not
classifiable as a public utility, there is no reason for direct assess-
ment by the Tax Commission, for such lines are not of a public
service character. And, in conclusion we may say that we refuse
to accept an interpretation which considers this category to com-
prehend more than that property necessary to the transmission
and/or distribution of electricity, whether engaged in such a pur-
suit as a common carrier or merely as a vendor of the commodity.
Water and Gas Distribution Systems
The third category listed is "water and gas distribution sys-
tems." The Commission has interpreted this phrase to compre-
hend property belonging to the gas and water producing plants
as well as that property necessary to the distribution of their
products. The assumption of jurisdiction in the face of the lan-
60. Supra note 13.
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guage "distribution systems" would seem to go beyond the in-
tendment of the legislators. The writer suggests that the adminis-
trative authorities here again exceed their authority, for only
specious rationalization would permit an interpretation to include
in this category gas and water producing plants when the statute
expressly modifies "water and gas systems" by using the word
"distribution."
Since there are no statutory provisions for classifying gas
distribution systems as common carriers, we are rescued from the
tedium of attempting to justify or rationalize the legislative word,
as, for instance, in the case of irrigation canal systems which
should be comprehended by the categoric "water distribution sys-
tems." The same statute which establishes criteria defining the
common carrier hydro-electric transmission lines has correspond-
ing provisions with regard to domestic corporations, organized
"with the power to build and construct canals for irrigation, trans-
portation of freight and passengers.""' In scrutinizing the direct
assessment clause it seems only logical to exclude therefrom
canals used in the transportation of freight and passengers as
well as navigation canals, and to confine the discussion here to a
consideration of irrigation canal systems; for none of the former
comprehends a distribution of water. While the law has made
provision for classification as common carriers those canal sys-
tems used for navigation purposes and for the transportation of
freight and passengers, the writer suggests that these should not
be considered within the scope of the direct assessment clause,
because the very precise language-water and gas distribution
systems-would exclude them. Should the question arise, through
spurious reasoning it might be held that the categoric "water and
gas distribution systems," if interpreted to cover irrigation canals,
is sufficiently broad to comprehend a canal system used for trans-
portation of passengers or freight or for navigation purposes, and
thus within the province of the Tax Commission to assess directly.
So far as this paper is concerned, however, we feel that it is
justifiable to confine ourselves to a discussion of irrigation canal
systems as being, possibly, within the jurisdiction of the Tax
Commission to assess directly. These canal systems are deemed
common carriers by Act 268 of 1916, if the conditions set out by
that act are fulfilled.2 It cannot be denied that this is specious
61. Supra note 58. Irrigation canals are not subject to regulation by the
Louisiana Public Service Commission. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VI, § 4.
62. La. Act 268 of 1916, § 7 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2875].
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reasoning to classify as a common carrier a corporation engaged
in selling its own water to customers. The writer has no quarrel
with this classification if the canal systems simply furnish the
means of transportation-i.e.-the canals themselves. However,
by some anomalous reasoning it seems that the legislature has
indulged in a fiction as regards an irrigation canal, engaged in the
business of selling its own water. So far as we are concerned,
such an irrigation canal system if classifiable at all as a utility
should be grouped, at best, with utilities which are purely local
in nature and falling within the second class defined by Bon-
bright,63 and thus distinguishable from the transportation type of
utility which is measured by standards applicable to common
carriers.
The only case' 4 in our jurisprudence touching upon Act- 157 of
1914 and Act 268 of 1916 held that a domestic irrigation canal
company was not a public utility since it did not seek any special
privilege or "secondary franchise" under these statutes, but the
court considered salient the fact that there Was not sufficient evi-
dence authorizing the conclusion that it operated as a public
utility. It is, of course, impossible to hazard a guess as to what
the decision might have been if the court had felt that this com-
pany actually operated as a public utility. What prominence
might have been given Section 7 of the foregoing acts is not per-
ceivable from the language of the decision. 5
By Act 43 of 1920 gravity irrigation canal corporations or-
ganized or to be organized under the laws of the state are
"deemed public service corporations within the territory selected
by them for the distribution of water and shall furnish water
within the same." [Italics supplied.] This statute grants to such
corporations rights of expropriation without requiring, as a con-
dition precedent, a corporate resolution to the effect that the
status of "common carrier" is sought. This, seemingly, is an ex-
ception to the rule applicable to other irrigation canal systems
and this conclusion is further substantiated by the following
language in Act 43 of 1920-"Provided that nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed as conferring the right of expropriation
upon existing canal systems or declaring existing canal systems
to be public service corporations." This statute also comprehends
63. Supra note 13.
64. State ex rel. Coco, Attorney General v. Riverside Irr. Co., Ltd., 142
La. 10, 76 So. 216 (1917). See Opinions of Attorney General (1918-1920) 22.
65. Supra note 58.
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those corporations falling within the scope of Act 258 of 1918.16
It seems, then, that only these irrigation canal corporations, and
those gravity irrigation canal systems comprehended by Act 43 of
1920, need not depend upon the absurd fiction of common carriage
to be considered public service corporations. But, in order to de-
fine irrigation canal systems other than those specifically set out
above, we are relegated to this fiction and until there is some
classification or logical treatment of the problem, the resulting
absurdities will remain.
Before the enactment of Act 161 of 1938, the principles eluci-
dated above were inconsequential for purposes of a compilation
of the law on the subject of the power of direct assessment by the
Tax Commission or its predecessors. Because of that act, how-
ever, color is given to the foregoing discussion, since the assess-
ment of all canals should not be within the jurisdiction of the
local assessors. 7 The Commission in its "Assessment Suggestions
to Assessors and Police Juries" issued in February, 1942, directs
the assessors to assess irrigation plants, which include as property
water wells, pumps, power plants and canals, as improvements
to the real estate upon which they are located. It has been held
that a canal which is merely an improvement to the land, thus
not a navigation or irrigation canal from which water is sold,
would be assessed with the land and not separately; for the land
and not the canal would be the principal thing.8 Conversely, it
would seem that an irrigation canal engaged in the "business" of
selling water would be the principal thing to consider, and the
land would be incidental.
But the test for determining whether an irrigation canal is
within the jurisdiction of the Louisiana Tax Commission to assess
directly should comprehend more than an inquiry as to whether
water is offered for sale; the canal system should be shown to
possess the characteristics or attributes of a common carrier as
set out by Act 268 of 1916, or on the basis of the State ex rel. Coco
66. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIII, § 6.
67. The irrigation canal systems and corporate irrigation canal systems
which, by statute, are deemed common carriers or public service corporations
should be distinguished from ordinary canal systems which are not so defin-
able.
68. Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. Board of State Affairs, 154 La. 988, 98
So. 552 (1923). See language in Louisiana Tax Commission. Suggestions to The
Assessors and Parish Boards of Equalization (1928) to the effect that "canals
are subject to assessment. The ordinary drainage ditches, of course, are not
included, as they are taken into consideration in the value of the land, but all
timber canals, irrigation, towing [et cetera] canals are to be assessed."
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case,19 it should be shown to be engaged in business as a quasi
public corporation. No test or rule need be set for gravity irriga-
tion canal systems falling within the scope of Act 43 of 1920, for
these are deemed to be public service corporations per se, so that
there is no need to seek criteria for measuring them for the ulti-
mate purpose of determining whether the Tax Commission has
jurisdiction to initiate the assessments.
Despite the fact that gravity irrigation canal companies have
been declared public service corporations, and other irrigation
canals have been deemed common carriers, the Tax Commission
has never assessed them directly. In reality, as the writer pointed
out previously, the local assessors are authorized to assess irri-
gation canals as improvements to the land.7 0 We suggest that the
Commission has more authority, in view of the verbiage of the
direct assessment clause, to assess these irrigation canal systems
than to initiate the assessment of the water producing plants.
Railway and Related Businesses
The Constitution declares all railroads to be public high-
ways," and by statutory provision, foreign as well as domestic
railroads are given rights of expropriation.7 2 But the broad lan-
guage of the constitutional provision is open, necessarily, to inter-
pretation, for as was pointed out previously, in defining the juris-
dictional limitations of the power of direct assessment vested in
the Tax Commission, the term railroad has been interpreted to
mean a business which serves the public generally, or to put it
precisely-each railroad or railway business must be a common
carrier. 78 Thus, logging railways, tram railways and tram road
equipment, as for example, flat cars, obviously should be without
the province of the Commission to assess directly.7 4 The rational-
ization justifying the court's refusal to grant permission to the
State Railroad Commission to regulate a railroad built on the
lands of adjoining plantations for the exclusive use and conveni-
ence of both is relevant here, for such a railroad is private, em-
ployed for private purposes and "It may have none of the bene-
fits and advantages of a common carrier, as for instance, the right
69. Supra note 64.
70. Louisiana Tax Commission, Assessment Suggestions to Assessors and
Police Juries (1942) 26.
71. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIII, § 3.
72. Supra note 71. La. Act 84 of 1882, La. Act 73 of 1902 and La. Act 267
of 1910 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8015-8019].
73. See discussion supra pages 509 and 510.
74. Louisiana Tax Commission, Assessment Suggestions to Assessors and
Police Juries (1942 and previous years).
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of eminent domain, hence it carries with it none of the burdens
and obligations of a common carrier as such."7 5
This is the kind of reasoning which justifies local assessment
or valuation of such railway property, and, as a matter of fact, the
courts have carried over into some of the railway exemption
cases this theory of use for private purposes, concluding that eli-
gibility for tax exemption is dependent upon the offer of service
to the public generally. 6 At the same time it has been held that
exemption from taxation was meant to apply only to commercial
railways, i.e., public service corporations in the service of the en-
tire state, and not merely to a suburban or local railway, even
though the latter be a common carrier.7 This theory of tax ex-
emption is, of course, predicated upon the idea of encouraging the
development of commerce and industry in the state. At the same
time it is interesting to note that insofar as tax exemption is con-
cerned, a sharp line of distinction has been drawn between the
common carrier railroads (other than the merely local ones) and
those used for private purposes, just as the line has been drawn
in determining the scope of power in matters of rate regulation,
et cetera, by the Public Service Commission. In both of these in-
stances, as well as in our instant problem of defining the juris-
dictional aspect of the power of original assessment by the Tax
Commission, it is incumbent, theoretically at least, upon the ad-
ministrative officers to determine primarily whether the property
is used for public or private purposes.
Our consideration of this category does not terminate with
the simple, axiomatic statement that if a railway business is a
common carrier, the Tax Commission has the power to assess
originally that property used in the conduct of the business. It is
not enough, in discussing this category merely to define "railway
business" in terms of common carriers, and neglect to mention
the fact that if a liberal or catholic interpretation is given the
term "railway," any tank car company, for instance, would fall
within the scope of the direct assessment clause. Yet, it is ob-
vious that the interpretation given the word "railway" has been
questioned, for in its "Suggestions to Assessors and Parish Boards
of Equalization" for the year 1938, at page 34, the Louisiana Tax
75. Louisiana Distillery Co. v. M.L. v T.R.R. & S.S.Co., 2 Orl. App. 27 (La.
App. 1904).
76. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co. v. State Board of Appraisers, 135 La. 69, 64 So.
985 (1914); Sibley L.B. & S. Ry. v. Elliott, 136 La. 793, 67 So. 884 (1914); Dor-
cheat Valley R.R. v. Clement, Tax Collector, 137 La. 520, 68 So. 857 (1915).
77. Shreveport Suburban Railway Co. v. Hollingsworth, 131 La. 105, 59
So. 30 (1912).
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Commission, though perhaps inadvertently, assumed the legis-
lative prerogative by adding to Section 10, paragraph 2, of Act
140 of 1916, as amended in 1918, the italicized language in the
following provisions: "the actual cash valuation and assessment
of railway, telegraph, telephone, tank car,, sleeping car and ex-
press business throughout the State of Louisiana is fixed and as-
sessed directly by the Louisiana Tax Commission for all pur-
poses."
But the poor draftsmanship of the "direct assessment clause"
is particularly evident if one accepts the premise that the term
"railway" comprehends private car lines, i.e., railway businesses
carried on through the use of facilities (other than rolling stock)
belonging to other railway businesses, as terminals, tracks, et
cetera, and then discovers as a separate and distinct category-set
out in the direct assessment clause - "sleeping car business."
Whether this study be directed toward a consideration of a tank
line company or a sleeping car company, the fact remains that
they are both of the same class or type of business-private car
lines. Thus the separate and distinct category-sleeping car bus-
iness, is mere redundancy.
The writer is in doubt as to whether the law is settled on the
point that the terminology "railway business" as used in the di-
rect assessment clause comprehends both domestic and foreign
car lines. But we admit that the method of assessing the rolling
stock of both residents and non-residents, by the unit rule, is per-
missible; that "line" as used in Act 170 of 1898, Section 29 con-
notes "the route over which the railroad company carries on its
business, whether on its own tracks or on tracks owned by an-
other corporation."78 Actually, the latter part of Section 29 pro-
vides that rolling stock or movable property belonging to any
interstate transportation company, whether it be a railway, bus,
or trucking company, et cetera, is to be assessed by the unit rule
method. This method, as a means of determining the "actual cash
value" of property will be discussed in the latter part of this
paper.
Aside from the fact that a private car line, domestic or for-
eign, might own property in the state other than rolling stock,
which property is used in the conduct of its business, our chief
concern is to attempt to set out the law and obviate what con-
fusion there is regarding the authority of the Tax Commission to
78. Director General of Rys. v. Hughes, Tax Collector, 157 La. 8, 101 So.
728 (1924).
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assess directly the rolling stock belonging to the domestic car
lines. Railway property, other than rolling stock, whether owned
by a private car line company or which is simply a part of a rail-
way system will be considered in a subsequent discussion involv-
ing Section 29 of Act 170 of 1898, as amended.79
Sections 6 of Act 122 of 190080 provides that the State Board of
Appraisers may adopt rules and regulations in order to determine
the valuation of railway property, as well as property belonging
to other enumerated types of business. This provision was fol-
lowed by a series of statutes concerned specifically with the prob-
lem of assessment and taxation of a particular kind of railway
property, i.e., rolling stock, belonging to a particular class of own-
ers, non-residents. The first of these statutes simply gave to the
State Board of Appraisers the authority "to levy an assessment
upon the value as may be fixed by them as fair and just upon the
rolling stock of foreign corporations,"8'' and reiterated, in sub-
stance, that the unit rule method for determining valuation was
to be employed. While the language quoted is cumbersome and
prolix, it is sufficient, probably, to say that it is merely a restate-
ment of the rule that such property is assessed or valued directly
by a centralized board for purposes of taxation.
Section 4 of Act 9 of 1917, Extraordinary Session, is a decided
improvement over the foregoing for it states that "the Board of
State Affairs, as created by Act 140 of 1916, is hereby vested with
the authority to determine actual cash value of and to assess all
such rolling stock for all taxable purposes," referring, of course,
to the rolling stock of non-residents. Section 12 limits the act to
private car lines, that the provisions of the statute "shall not ap-
ply to the rolling stock of any regularly incorporated railway
company, operating a railroad in the United States of America,
the Dominion of Canada, or the Republic of Mexico."
Section 6 of Act 109 of 1921 reiterates the rule that the actual
cash value of foreign rolling stock, belonging to persons, firms,
et cetera, who are non-residents of the state and have no domicil
in the state, is determined by the Louisiana Tax Commission.
This act is predicated upon the constitutional provision that such
rolling stock is taxed by the state for state purposes only.82
79. La. Acts 89 and 152 of 1932 amend Section 29 of Act 170 of 1898 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 8370]. This section also provides for the unit rule method of
valuing rolling stock.
80. This act supersedes Act 106 of 1898 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8325, 8326].
81. La. Act 281 of 1914, § 1, last paragraph. But this has been super-
seded. [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8292n].
82. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 16.
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The law is well-settled that the Tax Commission has author-
ity to value originally for purposes of taxation foreign rolling
stock as well as rolling stock belonging to non-residents who have
declared or been assigned domicils in the state. 8 It would seem,
then, that the Commission has the power to value originally roll-
ing stock belonging to residents of the state, engaged in railway
business as are non-residents."4 However, confusion and doubt
arise when one considers statement 13 of the Agreed Statement of
Facts in the case of Pennsylvania Tank Line Company v. Day,85
to the effect that "the State Board of Appraisers did not assess the
property of Penick and Ford and the Louisiana Oil Company, do-
mestic corporations operating tank cars in this said State, but that
the cars of said companies were assessed at the domicils of these
companies by parish assessors." (Italics supplied.) The import
of this language is accentuated when we consider two opinions by
the Attorney General which were concerned with determining
whether the molasses tank line belonging to Penick and Ford was
a railway business, "assessable by the Board of State Affairs
only."8 It was the opinion of the Attorney General that Act 281
of 1914 did not repeal Section 1 of Act 122 of 1900, which author-
izes the State Board of Appraisers to assess any kind of property
in Louisiana which is used in the railway business; that if the
property here is so used, a fortiori, the Board has the power to
assess it. This opinion stated that litigation relating to the prob-
lem was pending at the time, but if any decisions were rendered
on this particular issue, your writer has been unable to discover
them.
If these tank cars were not common carriers, but used merely
to facilitate another business, theoretically there is no problem,
as we know. But if the crux of the matter be simply the fact that
this property was owned by a resident, it would seem that in the
light of statement 13 of the Agreed Statement of Facts in the
Pennsylvania Tank Line case, cited above, there is authority for
stating that domestic rolling stock is valued locally. One might
interpose the argument that the word "assess" should be inter-
preted to mean that the local assessor merely lists the valuation
on the assessment rolls on the basis of instructions disseminated
83. Supra note 82. La. Act 9 of 1917 (E.S.), § 4 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
8304]. La. Act 109 of 1921 ,(E.S.), § 6 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8297].
84. See Louisiana Oil Refining Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 167 La.
605, 120 So. 23 (1929). Here the Tax Commission apparently valued the roll-
ing stock.
85. La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 22,758 (1917).
86. Opinions of the Attorney General (1916-1918) 311 and 313.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
by the Tax Commissiony for the term "assess" may be construed
to mean merely setting a valuation and listing the property in the
process of assessment for purposes of taxation, as well as the en-
tire taxing process, including the application of the rate to the tax
base and the determination of the amount of taxes due thereon.8
As we previously stated, this apparent distinction between
foreign and domestic rolling stock for the purpose of setting up
jurisdictional limitations in the power of direct assessment or val-
uation by the Louisiana Tax Commission has never been made an
issue in any of the reported litigation. The court would consider,
in all probability, that the efficacy of Section 6 of Act 122 of 1900
was not impaired by these subsequent statutes which are con-
cerned with rolling stock of non-residents, leaving, then, to the
Commission the power of original valuation of all common carrier
rolling stock belonging to both foreign and domestic private car
lines.""
As a practical matter the Louisiana Tax Commission requires
each railroad doing business in the state to report the milage
earned by all rolling stock using their routes. No distinction is
made between the rolling stock used for purposes of common car-
riage and that which merely facilitates another business, as for
instance the dairy business of the Cloverland Dairy of New Or-
leans. As the writer previously suggested it would seem that the
Commission exceeds its authority in valuing originally this kind
of property, notwithstanding the argument of expediency.
Another instance in which the Commission exceeds its juris-
dictional authority lies in the fact that rolling stock earning less
than 500 miles in the state during the year is not valued at all.
Our Constitution states expressly which property is to be exempt
from taxation.9 0 The immunity from taxation granted this per-
sonalty by the Tax Commission raises a constitutional question,
because such immunity is nothing more than a left-handed ex-
emption. The argument was advanced to the effect that the line
must be drawn at some point or it would be impossible to accom-
plish the task of evaluation. Too, it is true that very often the
amount of revenue to be realized is so negligible that it is not
worthwhile to tax this rolling stock. The writer admits the ad-
87. See Opinions of Attorney General (1932-1934) 830.
88. See Flanigan v. Police Jury of Jackson Parish, 145 La. 613, 82 So. 722
(1919).
89. The writer wants to reiterate the fact that the Tax Commission as-
sesses or values directly the domestic private car lines.
90. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 4.
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ministrative merits of the argument, but it is not within the pro-
vince of any administrative body to decide which property should
be exempt from taxation. In evaluation the granting of allow-
ances for idle cars and special equipment where a certain daily
mileage is not earned would seem to be an equitable way of
tempering assessments."1
The category "railway business" has been construed by the
Commission to comprehend local street railways. There is no
denying the fact that such systems are common carriers. How-
ever, one Attorney General opinion declared that street railways
were not assessable by the State Board of Appraisers but by the
local assessors.9 2 This interpretation is incongruous with that of
the Commission, and the rationalization of this opinion is probably
the same accorded the constitutional provision exempting from
taxation newly constructed railways for a definite period. It was
held in the latter instance that such exemption was intended to
apply to commercial railroads, that is, public service corporations
serving the entire state; that a local street railway serves a par-
ticular locale, and though classifiable as a common carrier, was
without the scope or purpose of the exemption provision. 8 The
reasoning is basically that the term "railway," when used by the
legislators, refers to a public service corporation whose activities
are not localized. Hence, when the Attorney General stated that
the local assessors had authority to assess street railways, he was
motivated, in all probability, by this notion of localization of
activities. The language of the opinion was to the effect that had
the legislators intended the State Board of Appraisers to exercise
jurisdiction in assessing street railways, they would have em-
ployed the word "street" as a modification of "railways"; that Act
106 of 1898 uses only the term "railway," and this is to be inter-
preted as excluding the local street railways."
Assuming that the Commission does have authority to value
originally these local street railways, a nice question arises in view
of the fact that municipal, interurban or suburban railways are
being displaced continuously by bus systems. Needless to say this
latter type of local transportation cannot be forced into the cate-
gorical "railway business." By constitutional exemption motor
vehicles are exempt from state, parish and special taxes, but mu-
91. The Tax Commission does grant allowances in such instances effect-
ing reductions in the assessments.
92. Opinions of Attorney General (1898-1900) 70.
93. Supra note 77.
94. Supra note 92.
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nicipalities and their political subdivisions may levy taxes. 5 Un-
der such a set-up the Commission seems to agree that the local
assessor would have authority to value these vehicles for taxation
purposes, even though there might be need for valuation by a
centralized body, particularly where the bus systems are engaged
in inter-parish transportation.
However, your writer suggests that the problem is not solved
so easily when one considers, let us say, the automotive equip-
ment belonging to an enterprise falling within the last category
of the direct assessment clause, "express business." Although
these vehicles are exempt from state, parish and special taxes,
municipalities may levy taxes. Do the municipal authorities or
even the parish assessors have the power to value such property
or is the absolute authority of evaluating vested in the Tax Com-
mission? To our knowledge this question has never arisen, but it
would seem that the latter alternative is the correct position.
It would be expedient, perhaps, to consider the efficacy of
Section 29 of Act 170 of 1898 from a jurisdictional viewpoint6
Again, we are not concerned at the moment with the last proviso
of this section, which provides for the unit rule method of assess-
ing rolling stock or movable property of transportation com-
panies. Nor are the preceding provisions of material value in our
initial problem of defining the jurisdictional limitations in the
power of direct or original assessment . 7 The verbiage of this
section comprehends property belonging to transportation enter-
prises, both public utility and non-public utility, and the writer
supposes its ultimate purpose is to designate which of the local
governments have jurisdiction to levy taxes after the property
described therein has been apportioned and this seems to be the
interpretation or view of the authorities.18 The problem of appor-
tioning or allocating the property to the local governments will be
considered in the last part of this paper.
As we have said, all of the property listed in this section is
either transportation property per se or property belonging or in
some way related to a transportation business. But it would be
fabrication to state that this section is concerned only with prop-
95. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 4, paragraph 8. La. Act 5 of 1934 (2 E.S.)
[Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5736.1-5736.51. This act provides for supervision of the
assessments by the Tax Commission.
96. Supra note 79.
97. This statement is true if the interpretation of the words "assessed"
and "taxed" as used in this section is not accepted. See infra p. 32.
98. See discussion infra page 55.
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erty belonging to businesses classifiable as public utilities, or for
that matter, to state that such property belongs to common car-
riers or is of itself common carrier property. This section pro-
vides that the property therein described shall be assessed and
taxed in the various parishes or assessment districts, that is, lo-
cally. Here, of course, we are concerned primarily with the inter-
pretation to be given the term "assessed" which is used conjunc-
tively with the word "taxed." As we have said "assess" and "as-
sessment" may have one or more meanings 9 The logical impli-
cation, however, is that where the word "assessed" is used with
"taxed" with respect to ad valorem taxation the authorities should
interpret it to comprehend the evaluation of property and per-
haps the listing of such valuation on the assessment rolls, but
nothing more, and the word "taxed" should comprehend the cal-
culation and actual levy by the proper authorities.
The writer suggests that the foregoing interpretation, though
resulting in a conflict with regard to determining the jurisdic-
tional limitations of the power of direct assessment or valuation
is as reasonable as that apparently assumed by the authorities,
who refuse to consider this section more than an authority for
apportioning property to the local units of government. We re-
iterate that this viewpoint avoids confusion, but our suggested in-
terpretation is not without basis. Here, again, we see mirrored
confusion which is the result of poor construction and usage of
language, the usual thing in the property assessment and taxation
statutes of the state.
Telegraph, Telephone, Sleeping Car and Express Businesses
The remaining categories of the direct assessment clause are
"telegraph, telephone, sleeping car and express business." The
former two might be classified, perhaps, as common carriers of
intelligence, 100 and the latter are undoubtedly measured in terms
of common carriers."" It is also possible to define any telephone
business as a hybrid type of utility, a common carrier in the trans-
mission of intelligence and at the same time, a system which
maintains physical connections with the premises of its customers
to facilitate the rendition of service. It is needless, perhaps, to
99. Supra note 88.
100. States other than Louisiana have expressly declared telegraph and
telephone companies to be common carriers. Gainesboro Telephone Co. v.
Buckner, 169 S.W. 1000, 1002, 160 Ky. 604 (1914); Bailey v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 171 S.W. 839, 842 (Tex. 1914).
101. The transportation utilities are measurable in terms of common car-
riers. See discussion supra page 13.
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reiterate such propositions as, for instance, that private tele-
phones and telephone cooperatives are without the scope of the
direct assessment clause. 0 2 As to the category "express busi-
ness," the writer was informed that there is only one express
company in Louisiana assessed originally by the Tax Commis-
sion.10 a Its personalty as, for instance, scales used for weighing
freight, are valued in the same manner as is other property fall-
ing within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
In conclusion it might be said that despite the assumption of
power in some instances by the Commission, because of the prac-
tical aspects in the problem of evaluation, the concept "business"
has been interpreted to comprehend only that kind of property
which has the attributes essential for classification as public util-
ity property. But, the fact remains that there has been no elabo-
ration in the reported litigation on the problem of ascertaining
the jurisdictional limitations in the power of original assessment
regarding property falling within the scope of any of these re-
maining categories. So it seems to the writer that it is only neces-
sary with regard to these remaining categories to utilize the ap-
plicable criteria previously set out and it is equally unnecessary
to restate them at this time.
THE DETERMINATION OF VALUE OF UTILITY PROPERTY
Having attempted to define the jurisdictional limitations of
direct or original assessments by the Louisiana Tax Commission,
we are concerned next with determining the methods by which
the property of the so-called utilities is valued, and finally, with
the apportionment and certification of these assessments to the
assessors in order that the tax rolls may be completed for pur-
poses of the state and local levies.
The valuation of all property in the state for purposes of as-
sessment cannot exceed its "actual cash value."'1 A priori, the
property belonging to the so-called public utilities should be as-
sessed by the Commission not in excess of its actual cash value.
Specifically, the pertinent part of Section 10, paragraph 2, of Act
140 of 1916, provides that "the actual cash valuation and assess-
ment ... shall be fixed and assessed by the Board [Louisiana Tax
Commission] for all purposes. '105
102. Supra note 35.
103. This is the Railway Express Company.
104. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 1.
105. Note in the amending statutes, La. Act. 161 of 1938 and La. Act 236
of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8321) the reference to the Board of State Af-
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Formerly, the ultimate test for measuring the "actual cash
value" of a given piece of property was to determine the price for
which the property "would sell for, for cash in the ordinary
course of business, free of all incumbrances otherwise than by
forced sale."'10 6 In 1934, however, the legislature, in re-defining
this phrase, rendered nugatory, impliedly, at least, a host of de-
cisions predicated upon this principle.10 To date there are no re-
ported decisions raising issues which involve a consideration of
the new definition, which reads as follows:
"The words 'actual cash value' or 'actual cash valuation,'
shall mean the valuation at which any real or personal prop-
erty is assessed for the purpose of taxation, after the assessing
authorities have considered every element of value in arriving
at such valuation. And the price at which any piece of real
estate or personal or movable property shall have been sold
for cash in the ordinary course of business, free of all encum-
brances, otherwise than at forced sale, shall be evidentiary
only, and to be considered with other factors in determining
the actual cash value for assessment purposes."
In this latest definition, then, the former ultimate test is, at most,
just another element to be considered in the determination of
"actual cash value."
With the possible exception of the rolling stock cases we are
confronted with the fact that there is almost a dearth of reported
litigation in the state on issues involving the determination of
the "actual cash value" of public utility property. There is per-
haps a logical reason for this, to be found in the statutes setting
fairs instead of the Louisiana Tax Commission, which displaced the board in
1921.
106. La. Act 170 of 1898, § 91 (6), as amended and re-enacted in La. Act
130 of 1902, § 5 (6) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8200].
107. La. Act 126 of 1934 amended and re-enacted the statutes cited supra
note 3. [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8200]. Mackay Telegraph Co. v. Board of State
Affairs, 149 La. 397, 89 So. 249 (1921). This case deals specifically with the
valuation of utility property, namely, property belonging to a telegraph com-
pany. But see the following with regard to the valuation of property belong-
ing to lumber companies: Lyon Lumber Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commission,
158 La. 990, 105 So. 39 (1925); Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Jackson, 161 La.
669, 109 So. 351 (1926).
The constitutionality of this statute may be questioned in view of the im-
plication that the "actual cash value" of property is no longer absolutely de-
terminable in terms of present day market value. The writer suggests the
purport of the constitutional phrase "actual cash value" is market value, stat-
utory language to the contrary notwithstanding. In criticising this act, we
admit that it was essentially a depression measure, enacted to enable the
levying units of government to maintain a sufficient flow of public revenues
despite the breakdown of the market.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
up the authority of the Louisiana Tax Commission or its prede-
cessors to assess directly the property belonging to the so-called
utilities. Act 106 of 1898, Section 6, as amended and re-enacted by
Act 122 of 1900, Section 6, provides that the State Board of Ap-
praisers "shall have the right to adopt such rules and regulations
it may deem necessary" for making "a true and correct assess-
ment and valuation of all property belonging to corporations, as-
sociations or individuals employed in railway, telegraph, tele-
phone, sleeping car and express business." The broad and unre-
strictive language of this section, in addition to the fact that there
has been little or no litigation on the subject, justifies the conclu-
sion that, generally, there are no absolute standards by which the
Commission is bound in its valuation of utility property. True,
this premise admits of exceptions, for instance, as regards rolling
stock, which is assessed by means of a unique yardstick, the unit
rule,1'0 and which merits special consideration at a later point. It
was held, however, that had there been no statutory provision for
the unit rule method of assessment, still under Section 6 of Act
122 of 1900 "It is quite likely that this 'right to adopt such rules
and regulations,' as the board may deem necessary for the pur-
pose of making a true and correct assessment and valuation of all
property employed in the railway business, would be construed to
include the authority to adopt and apply the so-called unit rule,
for the assessment of the rolling stock of an interstate railroad."'' 1 9
The oft-repeated language of New Orleans Cotton Exchange
v. Board of Assessors"0 is especially true with respect to the pres-
ent discussion, for,
"There exists, in fact, no rigid rules for the valuation of
property, which is affected by a multitude of circumstances
which no rule could foresee or provide for.
"The assessors must consider all these circumstances and
elements of value, and must exercise a prudent discretion in
reaching conclusions."
How then does the Commission determine generally the "actual
cash value" of property-"the constitutional basis of its taxa-
tion?""' Insofar as so-called public utility property is concerned,
108. Supra note 79.
109. Director General of Railroads v. Hughes, Tax Collector, 157 La. 8,
101 So. 728 (1924).
110. 37 La. Ann. 423 (1885).
111. See state ex rel. Johnson v. State Tax Collector, 39 La. Ann. 530, 2
So. 59 (1887).
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it seems to the writer that this question may be answered by sim-
ply saying that because of the broad language in which the perti-
nent statutes are couched, the only restraint is that the Commis-
sion not abuse its power by adopting patently unconstitutional
and discriminatory methods.
In order to aid the Commission in its duty of initiating the
specific assessments, Section 10, paragraph 14, of Act 140 of 1916,
as amended and re-enacted, 1 12 in part provides that it is required
of "individuals, partners, companies, associations and corporations
engaged in railway, telegraph, telephone, sleeping car and ex-
press business, or in any transportation business to furnish in-
formation concerning their capital, funded on other debt, current
assets and liabilities, value of property, earnings, operating and
other expenses, taxes and other facts which may be needful to en-
able the board to ascertain the value and the relative burdens
borne by all kinds of property in the state according to such forms
as shall be prescribed by the board, and at such time as it may fix."
The latter part of this section provides that individuals, compa-
nies, partnerships and corporations must make further reports to
the Board (now the Loui'iana Tax Commission) which shall be
confidential and used only for the purpose of securing correct as-
sessments. This latter provision is not limited to railways, et cet-
era, or any transportation business; all individuals, companies, et
cetera, must make these reports, and one decision has stated that
"such reports are not intended as the basis of individual assess-
ment, but for comparison, in order to arrive at an average fair
value of the plants and products of such corporations. "113 In other
words, by this decision, at least, this part of paragraph 14, Section
10, of Act 140 of 1916 seems to be, in effect, somewhat of an elab-
oration upon the power of equalization vested in the Louisiana
Tax Commission, despite the language which provides that the
reports are to be used only to secure correct assessments.
The first part of paragraph 14, quoted above, apparently
serves a dual purpose, enabling the Commission to utilize the re-
ports for valuation and equalization purposes. Then, too, by Sec-
tion 4 of Act 9 of the Extraordinary Session of 1917 all non-resi-
dents operating rolling stock over any railway in the state must
furnish "such reports of their operations as the said Board. may
require, in order to enable the said Board to determine actual
112. La. Act 211 of 1918, La. Act 236 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8321].
113. See Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Jackson, Assessor, 161 La. 669, 109
So. 351 (1926).
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cash value and to assess said rolling stock." Both of these statu-
tory provisions authorize the Board (the Commission) to demand
whatever information necessary to the exercise of its powers and
duties in the field of assessment. These provisions, as well as Sec-
tion 6 of Act 122 of 1900, quoted above, are concerned specifically
with the carrier type of utility business. Pretermitting the fact
that the authority to assess directly certain utilities falling within
the second class as defined by Bonbright 114 necessarily includes
the power to adopt procedures and methods incident to the exer-
cise of such right, the fact remains that there is no express refer-
ence to this kind of utility in the broad language of Section 6 nor
in the other two sections cited above. Here, again, we see inade-
quacy in the statutes, reflecting upon the legislature for failing to
bring these statutory provisions to date.
Nevertheless, from an administrative point of view we may
state that various businesses, classified by the Tax Commission as
public utilities or public service corporations, whether engaged in
business as carriers or otherwise, are required to make reports as
specified. In addition to these reports, it seems that the various
utilities must furnish the Commission a sworn, formalized state-
ment listing therein all properties. If such lists are not furnished
as required by law before April 1 of the current year, the Parish
of Orleans excepted, the taxpayer is said to have lost his right to
contest the correctness of the assessment,1 1' which is then made
without the use of tax lists. So it was held under Section 14 of
Act 170 of 1898 that a railway company was not estopped from
contesting the correctness of its assessment since it furnished its
"assessors" with a tax list, and "assessor" in this section means,
evidently, "the assessor by whom the assessment is to be made.
This assessor in the case of railway property is the state board of
appraisers; and the plaintiff company furnished to said board the
list thus required."" 6 Section 14 of Act 170 of 1898 was amended
and re-enacted by Section 3 of Act 182 of 1906, which also ex-
cepted the Parish of Orleans from the force of its provisions. As
the writer understands it, April 15 or thereabouts" 7 is the delin-
quency date for the return of tax lists in Orleans Parish. How-
114. Supra note 13.
115. Crowell & Spencer Lumber Co. v. La Fleur, 137 La. 772, 69 So. 170
(1915); Calcasieu Trust & Savings Bank v. Wetherell, 139 La. 454, 71 So. 765
(1916); Bowman-Hicks Lumber Co., Inc. v. Cole, 151 La. 303, 91 So. 744 (1922).
See Opinions of Attorney General (1934-1936) 1297, 1298.
116. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Aucoin, 140 La. 768, 772, 73
So. 859, 860 (1917).
117. La. Act 170 of 1898, § 25 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 83441.
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ever, the Commission has made April 1 delinquency date for the
return of tax lists by all utilities in the state. There is statutory
authority under Section 6 of Act 122 of 1900 for setting the same
time for the return of tax lists by the enumerated so-called public
service businesses both in and out of Orleans Parish. But this
statute was drawn only with reference to the five categories-
"railways, telephone, telegraph, sleeping car and express busi-
ness," so that the same authority is inapplicable to the three cate-
gories added in Act 161 of 1938-"gas and oil pipe lines, electrical
transmission lines, (and) water and gas distribution systems."
(Parenthesis supplied.)
We must not confuse the date upon which tax lists are made
returnable to the assessors with what the authorities call "tax
date." The former's importance is procedural, for purposes of de-
termining rules of administration, but the latter relates to the
substantive phase of the law. So the courts have held time and
again that assessments for the current year are made on the basis
of the condition of things as they exist on January 1 of each calen-
dar year.118 There are exceptions to this general rule, as for in-
stance August 1 is tax date for Orleans Parish,119 but the Louisi-
ana Tax Commission has used January 1 as tax date for utilities
in Orleans and, in valuing railway property at least, has stated
that it must adhere to and apply this principle to the letter.' In
an opinion which was really rendered by the Department of -Rev-
enue, the purported successor to the Louisiana Tax Commis-
sion,1 21 we find the following language:
"Conditions existing on January 1st of each year is the
118. Mackay Telegraph Co. v. Board of State Affairs, 149 La. 397, 89 So.
249 (1921); Gulf Public Service Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 167 La. 757,
120 So. 286 (1929); Louisiana Oil Refining Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commission,
167 La. 605, 120 So. 23 (1929); New Orleans Bank & Trust Co. v. City of New
Orleans, 176 La. 946, 147 So. 42 (1933). See Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v.
Jackson, 161 La. 669, 109 So. 351 (1926); Natalbany Lumber Co. v. Louisiana
Tax Commission, 175 La. 110, 143 So. 20 (1932); Frost Lumber Industries v.
Pickel, 181 La. 180, 159 So. 316 (1935). See also Opinions of Attorney General
(1934-1936) 1306 and 1311.
119. La. Act 227 of 1936, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8345).
Other exceptions are found in the rules providing for the taxation of
credits on an average drawn in the preceding year and in the rule relating to
stock in trade, set out in Section 7 of Act 170 of 1898, as amended by Act 78
of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8328), which has been interpreted by the court
in Penden Iron and Steel Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 163 La. 102, 111
So. 614 (1927). Followed in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Sandlin, 18 La. App.
287, 137 So. 595 (1931). See Opinions of Attorney General (1936-1938) 1088.
120. See discussion infra p. 538.
121. Opinion of Department of Revenue, Docket No. L., Re: Illinois Cen-
tral System, et al. See supra note 5.
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yardstick to be applied in assessing all property in Louisiana,
irrespective of its character, classification or use."
Further,
"The existing status on a fixed date is the law that governs
and no administrative formula can change it. All renditions
are submitted on this basis and the jurat of each supports the
data supplied as of the date listed ......
Despite this definitive language the opinion states further that
the Department was bound to follow the standard set by the
Louisiana Tax Commission in valuing railroads, which is "based
on the reproduction cost of such railroads, as reported by the In-
terstate Commerce Commission, less depreciation, and plus addi-
tions and betterments made since the date of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission valuation." We find more elucidative language
to the effect that "the 'actual cash value' of railroad property, for
purposes of taxation, has been determined by the taxing authori-
ties of Louisiana by the reproduction cost less depreciation, as re-
ported by the Interstate Commerce Commission, with considera-
tion given such factors or elements, as net earnings, competition
[et cetera].' 122 Inconsistency in reasoning and patent conflict are
at once apparent when one considers the foregoing statements
with the following: "it is established jurisprudence that property
must be assessed on the calendar year basis and must be valued
as of January 1, of each and every year." This criterion in itself
necessarily forbids and prohibits the Louisiana Tax Commission,
now Department of Revenue, from considering bond values and
earnings of past years in determining an assessment for the cur-
rent calendar year, or for any other year as long as the present
law remains unchanged." What are the "net earnings" referred
to in the former quotation and why are valuations set by the In-
terstate Commerce Commission for previous years considered in
the determination of the "actual cash value" of railway property,
and bond values and earnings of past years rejected? It is ob-
vious that "net earnings" as previously used are not determinable
122. See Crowell & Spencer Lumber Co. v. LaFleur, 137 La. 772, 776, 69 So.
170, 171 (1915) wherein it was stated that "Where a discretion is confided to
an officer [the assessor], it must be exercised by himself, and cannot be ex-
ercised by some one else for him." The writer suggests that the employment
of the replacement cost figures reported by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission might amount to an improper delegation of the power to assess
which is vested in the Tax Commission. We were informed that the Inter-
state Commerce Commission's valuations were used to determine only the
value of the trackage but this would not change the possibility of improper
delegability of the power to assess.
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only as of January 1 of the current year. If the Interstate Com-
merce Commission valuations are used as elements or bases in de-
termining "actual cash value," the argument is puerile which is
advanced against a consideration of the capitalization of net op-
erating income and the value of stocks and bonds on the hy-
pothesis that conditions as of January 1 of the current year con-
trol. No one will deny the fact that the Interstate Commerce
Commission's valuations are not as of January 1 of the current
year; then the discrimination is unwarranted which provides
against employing as elements, at least, the value of stocks and
bonds in past years and a capitalization of net operating income.
By refusing to consider past and future earnings, authorities
reject valuable data pertinent to the determination of the present
value of property. In permitting the use of such information to
determine "actual cash value" we are not acting contrary to the
mandate of the courts, which state that the condition of things as
of tax date, or January 1, govern in the assessment of property.
A prospective vendee investing his money would consider the
past and prospective earnings along with the stock and bond
values of a going concern because he would be interested in all
relevant information pertaining to the actual value of the busi-
ness.
There is an argument to be advanced against the employ-
ment of the capitalization of net operating income as either a
method or an element in the determination of "actual cash value,"
which, however, was not advanced in this opinion possibly for the
reason of its inapplicability with regard to railway property. The
basis of such an argument may be found in paragraph 14 of Sec-
tion 10 of Act 140 of 1916, as amended and re-enacted, 12 3 in the
clause which reads as follows: "except that no individual, corpo
ration or partnership shall be required to give his gross or net
earnings, the amount of expenses incurred or any salaries paid."
This provision would seem to refer generally to all businesses of
a public service nature or otherwise. However, this general lan-
guage must be limited to businesses other than those enumerated
in the first part of paragraph 14 of the same section, for therein
the Commission is vested with authority to demand reports from
the specifically enumerated businesses "concerning their... earn-
ings, operating and other expenses." Thus, the "actual cash value"
123. Supra note 112. The writer understands that the present legislature
has just passed House Bill 525 which deletes the clause considered in the
text. The bill awaits the Governor's signature at this writing.
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of property belonging to utilities, other than those comprehended
by the first part of paragraph 14, is not determinable by employ-
ing as a method or element in the method, the capitalization of net
operating income.
But the argument advanced here against considering net op-
erating income in the determination of "actual cash value" is in-
effectual as regards railroad property, since information regard-
ing "earnings, operating and other expenses" must be furnished
by the railroads. As a matter of fact, the only decision on the
books which treats of issues arising from the valuation of prop-
erty belonging to a railroad reversed the lower court for "giving
no material weight, or consideration to the evidence adduced in
regard to the net revenues and earnings of the road."'1 This case
is cited in the opinion as authority for a refusal to employ the
value of stocks and bonds in determining the value of railway
property,125 but is disregarded in the subsequent discussion of
''net earnings and revenues" of the railroad as an element or
factor in the evaluation process.
So far as railroad property is concerned this opinion states
dogmatically that value is determined on the basis of reproduc-
tion cost less depreciation, and that this has been the scheme for
a period of over thirty years. The "Minutes and Rulings of the
Louisiana Tax Commission" of August 20, 1926, September 21,
1932, and May 17, 1933, are cited as authority. The writer had
access to both latter rulings, and nowhere is replacement cost
less depreciation established as an absolute criterion for deter-
mining the value of railroad property. The fact is, in the 1932
ruling the Commission states frankly that "The main guide af-
forded the Commission in the fixing of real estate and like values
is absent when we seek an intelligent solution of railroad values,
namely, "selling values." Further, "Railroads are not bought and
sold like lands and commodities."
We suggest that in order to determine reproduction cost, one
must accept market values and the latter are synonymous with
"selling values." It is obvious that the Commission was compelled
to reduce assessments at this time because of the havoc wrought
124. Morgan's L. & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Board of Reviewers, 41 La. Ann.
1156, 3 So. 507 (1887). See Report of State Board of Appraisers (1898-1900).
But cf. the use of the net earnings rule in ascertaining the value of a public
utility franchise. Baton Rouge Electric Co. v. Board of State Affairs, 149 La.
383, 89 So. 244 (1921); Baton Rouge Water Works Co. v. Board of State Af-
fairs, 149 La. 391, 89 So. 247 (1921).
125. Supra note 121.
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by the depression, but if replacement cost less depreciation had
been considered the ultimate criterion, decreases in assessments
would have resulted, in all probability, in somewhat of a left-
handed exemption. The Commission stated that it took "cogni-
zance of the basis upon which the roads seek revaluation, namely,
the stock and bond method, and the method of capitalization of
net income" agreeing "with the courts that both methods are
most persuasive in arriving at true values for assessment pur-
poses, and the Commission in making its decision has studied the
effect produced by using such methods.'12 6 It is impossible to dis-
cern which method or combination of methods were used by the
Commission in re-valuing the property to allow reductions in
assessments. From the language quoted, however, it is rather
evident that replacement or reproduction cost less depreciation
was not employed even as the determining factor much less as the
scheme or method for valuing the property of the railroads.
The phrase "actual cash value," the constitutional basis for
assessing property in the state, defies definition by any "rule of
thumb." Like "true and correct value" and similar expressions, 127
the very fictitiousness of the language would condone an interpre-
tation which might preclude, at the outset, any clear and intelligi-
ble method proposed for valuing property. So far as the writer is
able to judge the "actual cash value" of utility property is what
the authorities make it, relying for the most part, upon their own
judgment. But the element of compromise or negotiation for
modification of assessment with the taxpayer is of basic impor-
tance. In the final analysis, however, if the assessed value of the
property is not obviously excessive in the opinion of the adminis-
trative authorities, no decrease will be allowed. There is no doubt
that complete and scientific accuracy in valuation is humanly im-
possible.' 28 Too, we must not forget a cardinal principle in the
field of taxation to the effect that "officers, charged with the func-
tion of assessing property for the purpose of taxation, are pre-
sumed to have pursued the proper method of ascertaining its
value and to have properly performed that duty.' 1 2 The taxpayer
126. "Minutes and Rulings of the Louisiana Tax Commission" of Septem-
ber 21, 1932.
127. "True and just value" and "actual value" are other common expres-
sions used as frequently as "actual cash value" in statutes and by the courts.
For a discussion of the former see Industrial Lumber Co. v. Oden, 147 La.
751, 85 So. 901 (1920).
128. See Soniat v. Board of State Affairs, 146 La. 450, 83 So. 760 (1920)
wherein the court said that there may be and are as many valuations as there
are individuals called upon to express opinions on the matter.
129. Bowman-Hicks Lumber Co., Inc. v. Cole, 151 La. 303, 91 So. 744 (1922).
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then has the burden of disproving or overcoming this presump-
tion, which is, of course, rebuttable. But, as a matter of fact, the
preponderance of evidence rule for overcoming presumptions, in
most instances, would render ineffectual at the outset, an attempt
to secure a reduction in assessment.
Practically speaking, the writer was told that most valuations
of utility property, including railroad property, are predicated on
"book value," but when this seems to be out of line for one reason
or another, an investigation of a more or less cursory nature is
made, and the valuation is reduced or increased accordingly.18 °
One can be sure that the employment of the phrase "actual cash
value" as the standard or basis for assessing property has pro-
duced untold confusion, particularly with regard to so-called util-
ity property. No one will deny that perspicuity is lacking in the
authorities, but they are in accord that the problem is not so acute
with regard to the valuation of a piece of land as it is when one
attempts to set the "actual cash value" of property belonging to
an interstate railway system. Insofar as concerns the former, evi-
dence of prices for which similar properties have been or are
being sold is easily obtainable; 1 1 but utility property is not
traded upon as is an ordinary piece of land. The artificiality of
the false doctrinal premise-"actual cash value"-is evident par-
ticularly when one attempts to rationalize the criteria by which
the "actual cash value" of so-called utility property is set.
As Bonbright so aptly puts it "As long, however, as the legis-
latures persist in their use of ad valorem taxes, the problem of
finding the least objectionable method of valuing a business en-
terprise for tax purposes will also persist;" that "this choice must
lie with one of three methods or else with some standardized com-
posite: (a) the stock-and-bond method, (b) the capitalized-real-
ized-earnings method, and (c) the depreciated-replacement-cost
or asset-value method.' 18 2
In the preceding discussion the writer attempted to show the
confusion attendant upon the valuation of one kind of utility
The same principle was elucidated in Industrial Lumber Co. v. Cole, 147 La.
751, 85 So. 901 (1920) and In New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Board of As-
sessors, 37 La. Ann. 423 (1885); Peavy-Wilson Co. v. Jackson, 161 La. 669, 109
So. 351 (1926); Frost Lumber Industries v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 174 La.
396, 141 So. 8 (1932).
130. Usually a trip is made to the situs of the property and an investiga-
tion is conducted there to determine the value of such property.
131. See discussion supra p. 532 Involving the new definition of "actual
cash value." But see 1 Bonbright, Valuation of Property (1937) 511-632.
132. Bonbright, op. cit. supra note 131, at 630, 631.
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property, namely, railway property. In the authority cited it was
stated expressly that the ultimate criterion for determining actual
cash value of railway property is the replacement cost less depre-
ciation method. But the annual reports filed by the railroads with
the Commission are inapposite to this premise, for "original cost
value" is the cardinal factor in each schedule concerned with the
return of physical properties. 133 The same is true with regard to
the property belonging to car lending, stock car, refrigerator,
sleeping car and other private car line companies. But the reports
of the oil and gas pipe lines and the localized utilities, other than
telephone and telegraph companies require that the property be
listed at "cost." The writer is not sure whether this term is the
same as "original cost" or is synonymous with "replacement (re-
production) cost." So far as the localized utilities are concerned,
there is the presumption that "original cost" is meant. Too, the
valuation of oil and gas pipe lines is determined, admittedly, in
accordance with a minimum values schedule, 3 4 which may be
higher than the reproduction values of the current year. So the
presumption would be here again that "cost" of property as listed
in the reports means "original cost."
One of the major obstacles to overcome, as we see it, is with
regard to the depreciation to be allowed on the property, whether
"reproduction cost" or "original cost" be the mode employed in
the evaluation. The administrative authorities are wont to use
fixed depreciations, but in at least one instance, wherein the valu-
ation of an oil pipe line was questioned, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals (Second Division) of Louisiana has said "while a fixed
depreciation test tends to uniformity in establishing values, it
must yield to evidence of actual depreciation of a specific object
the value of which is in dispute in a suit to correct an assessment.
Deterioration is not uniform. or constant in objects of the same
kind and character. The life of a pipe line varies in proportion to
the amount of destructive chemicals in the earth through which
it passes."'' 5 The taxpayer was allowed a decrease in assessment
of the pipe line since it was able to show definitively more depre-
ciation than credited by the authorities. The same reasoning was
adduced by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in the case of Peavy-
Wilson Lumber Company v. Jackson, wherein the assessment of
133. Railroads, Annual Report. to Louisiana Tax Commission, Schedules
10-13.
134. Louisiana Tax Commission, Suggestions to Assessors and Police
Juries (1942) 27-28.
135. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Sandlin, 18 La. App. 287 (1931).
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machinery, houses of mill hands, the plant, et cetera, was con-
tested.18 6 It would seem, then, that until the fixed or arbitrary
depreciations are questioned, the fact that uniformity in values
is established justifies the employment of fixed depreciations,
subject to the right of the taxpayer to rebut the so-called "actual
cash value" so fixed by producing evidence to the contrary.18 7
Without attempting to set forth the economists' nice distinc-
tion between "book value" of property and "original cost plus
additions and betterments," if any there be, so far as we are able
to discern, the terms usually are used interchangeably by the
administrative authorities in the determination of "actual cash
value" of utility, property. Thus, while telephone companies are
not required by the reports to give information concerning the
original cost of property, still they are assessed on the basis of the
"book value" of such property.188 However, the writer was told
that the property belonging to the Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Company is valued by a scheme compounded by the
company, which is accepted in toto by the Commission. This
scheme or method is predicated upon three factors, as we take it,
namely, (1) a capitalization of Louisiana net income, (2) the
book value of the property and (3) a capitalization of net income
throughout the United States. 89 "Book value" in this instance
would seem to be the value attributed the property by the officers
of the company and nothing more. So in this particular case,
"book value" and "original cost" are not the same. 40
As we mentioned previously, the reports in which property is
returned to the Commission for purposes of assessment require
"original cost" or the equivalent,"" except in the reports of tele-
phone and telegraph property. Although the administrative au-
thorities tend to employ the terminology "original cost" or its
equivalent synonymously with "book value," there can be no
quarrel so long as there is a sufficient degree of clarity in the pur-
port of the language. But we do question the legality of any
method employed for the determination of the "actual cash value"
of property, which is predicated upon either "book value" or
"original cost." As to the latter, the previously cited decision of
136. 161 La. 669, 101 So. 351 (1926).
137. Supra note 129.
138. "Book value" means in this instance the value of the property the
telephone companies carry on their books.
139. An average is taken of the three factors of this method, which is
drawn exclusive of Orleans Parish.
140. Cf. infra note 158.
141. Bonbright, op. cit. supra note 131, at 140-149.
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Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Board of Reviewers, Parish of
Iberia,"2 and a decision in 1921-Mackay Telegraph Co. v. Board
of State Affairs,14 refuse to countenance the argument advanced
by the taxpayer to the effect that the valuation of such property
for ad valoreum tax purposes should be grounded upon "original
cost less depreciation." The court in the latter decision held that
despite the fact that "the prices of labor and materials in the year
1917 [overassessment being claimed for that year] were very
much higher than those at the time the lines were constructed,
and that the basis of valuation should not be these inflated prices,
but those prevailing at the time of construction . . ." still "the
value of the property is to be determined as of the year of assess-
ment, and not of some year in the past."'"
There are decisions on the books appertaining to the valua-
tion of property other than utility property, which expressly re-
fuse to consider "book value" as the basis in the fixing of assess-
ments. 11 Then, jurisprudentially, it would seem that the admin-
istrative authorities transgress their authority in utilizing either
standard or criterion as the initial step in the assessment process.
The writer admits an incongruity in the face of Section 6 of Act
122 of 1900, which grants to the centralized body unlimited pow-
ers for adopting rules and regulations in the exercise of its au-
thority to initiate the specific assessments listed therein, and a
suggestion that the statutory law should govern is well taken."16
In a rather circuitous manner, the Mackay Telegraph case,
cited above, could be interpreted to substantiate the position that
all so-called utility property should be valued by employing the
.third method listed by Bonbright, i.e., replacement cost less de-
preciation." 7 However, the writer has attempted to show that,
practically, the "actual cash value" of utility property is not de-
termined through the utilization of this formula. Reiterating a
former conclusion, the valuation of the so-called utility property
is, in the main, dependent upon the judgment of the assessing
authority, the Louisiana Tax Commission. To elaborate upon this
conclusion, it might be said that the Commission has seen fit to
direct its authority for the most part toward, and at the same time
142. 41 La. Ann. 1156, 3 So. 507 (1887).
143. 149 La. 397, 89 So. 249 (1921).
144. See supra note 118.
145. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Jackson, 161 La. 669, 109 So. 351 (1926).
See also Industrial Lumber Co. v. Oden, 147 La. 751, 85 So. 901 (1920).
146. But note that this section does not extend to the first three cate-
gories of the direct assessment clause.
147. Supra note 132.
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predicate its power of initiating these assessments upon, the "orig-
inal cost less depreciation" method, decisions to the contrary not-
withstanding.
This method is not one of the "least objectionable" set out by'
Bonbright, 14 and much can be said against employing it in the
valuation process. This paper, however, does not purport to be a
thorough critique on the subject, nor does it venture to propose
a "cure-all" for the obvious confusion in the field of "public-
utility" property valuation. However, it is the opinion of the
writer that the objections to the employment of "original cost
less depreciation," with due consideration accorded improvements,
are so patent that there is justification in criticism even though
such criticism is not constructive.1 49 Assuming for the moment
that "original cost" of utility property is not available to the ad-
ministrative authorities, what method or even basic criterion is
utilized? So far as the writer is able to discover, an appraised
valuation, which is usually the "book value" assigned the prop-
erty by the taxpayer, is then appropriated as the initial, as well
as the final, step in the assessing process. The evolvement of the
valuation process is rather complicated as one can see from the
reports which the so-called utilities file annually with the Com-
mission, although a definite attempt has been made to simplify
an obviously complicated procedure by asking for specific and
detailed information, regarding, for instance, the obsolescence of
the property, the year in which it was purchased, et cetera. From
this information the authorities derive monetary figures which
represent the worth of the property. An outsider, as your writer,
is unable to state what weight is attributed each factor, nor offer
a compilation of the formulae employed in valuing the so-called
utility property.
A separate and distinct system has evolved in the valuation
of rolling stock. This has been called the Unit Rule Method and
has been given the approval of both the State Supreme Court and
the Supreme Court of the United States. 150 This method of assess-
148. Supra note 132.
149. Some of the objections may be listed as follows: (1) the records re-
vealing the "original cost" of property may be unobtainable; (2) there is a
subjective element to be accounted for especially in depreciating property;
(3) it is a difficult task to measure improvements and betterments, especially
in instances where property was cheaply constructed.
150. Director General of Railroads v. Hughes, 157 La. 8, 101 So. 728 (1924).
American Refrigerator Transit Company v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70, 19 S. Ct. 599, 43
L.Ed. 899 (1899). The unit rule has been employed in the determination of
the taxable proportion of capital stock belonging to an interstate company
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ing rolling stock and movable property on the basis of a mileage
ratio was sanctioned before the passage of Act 170 of 1898.11 The
latest statute, Act 152 of 1932 reiterates the rule, which reads as
follows:
". . but the rolling stock or movable property of any railroad
company, telegraph company, canal company or other trans-
portation company, whose line lies partly within this State and
partly within another State, or States, or whose sleeping cars
run over any line lying partly within this State or partly with-
in another State or States, shall be assessed in this State in the
ratio which the number of miles of the line within the state
has to the total number of miles of the entire lines."
Although the unit rule, as a mode of evaluation, applies to inter-
state bus systems and the like, we must remember that kind of
movable property is subject only to municipal taxes, under the
constitutional exemption of motor vehicles and boats using gaso-
line as fuel.' 52 The writer does not know whether the municipali-
ties, which exercise this right of taxation, employ the unit rule
measure for assessment purposes. If another mode is used, its
legality certainly may be questioned in view of the definitive
language quoted above.
As we previously pointed out, the Commission has assumed
jurisdiction for valuing all rolling stock using the regular railroad
routes in the state and, in at least one instance, has gone beyond
this by valuing the rolling stock belonging to a dairy business
simply for purposes of expediency. Since the jurisdictional prob-
lems have been discussed in the earlier part of the paper, our
concern here is to define the actual workings of the unit rule.
Procedurally the mode of securing information regarding
milage earned by rolling stock in the state is simple. The rail-
roads report the milage incurred by all of their rolling stock as
well as that earned by the rolling stock belonging to others.53
Copies are sent to the owners, who have ten days to check and
make corrections when necessary; too, protest must be filed with-
in this period.1 4 These reports are in addition to those filed an-
and is employed generally in arriving at the taxable values of interstate busi-
nesses by authorities of this and other states.
151. See La. Act 106 of 1890, § 27. This act, of course, has been superseded.
152. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 4, paragraphs 3 and 8.
153. This information is included in special forms in the annual reports
filed by all railroads with the Louisiana Tax Commission under Section 14 of
Act 140 of 1916, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8321].
154. The ten-day period is in the nature of an administrative measure,
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nually by special car lines, engaged in the railroad business. 5 '
As in the case of other property, where there is refusal or neglect
to report or certify the forms to the Commission, an arbitrary as-
sessment is made.
However, when the number and value per car of the rolling
stock of a given company operating in Louisiana has been set by
way of these reports, the assessment is then determined mathe-
matically by dividing the Louisiana milage by the total milage
made all over the United States and multiplying the result by the
value of the total number of cars operated.1 6 Idle car allowance
is granted upon request and each car is depreciated arbitrarily."'
Here again we find the value of each car or locomotive, et cetera,
determined on the basis of original cost instead of replacement
cost. But the authorities draw a distinction between "book value"
and "original cost" in valuing rolling stock, by fixing minimum
values, declaring that the value of the property cannot be less
than certain amounts listed irrespective of the book value re-
ported. 5 8
LOCAL APPORTIONMENT IN ASSESSMENTS OF UTILITY PROPERTY
A very troublesome problem is the apportionment of these
assessments among the proper local units of government. By
Section 29 of Act 170 of 1898, as amended in 1932,159 we find a pro-
vision to the effect that certain property which would include
rolling stock "shall be assessed and taxed at the domicile or prin-
cipal office," which is to be determined by Article XIII, Section 4,
of the Constitution of 1921. In the case of rolling stock belonging
to domestic railroads, the domiciliary parish and municipality have
rights to the revenues derived from the taxation of such property.
But domestic railroads, as such, are decidedly in the minority;
more of the railroads doing business in the state, whether they
and there is no penalty if a few extra days elapse before the copies are re-
turned to the Commission.
155. The special car lines file their own annual reports under Section 14
of Act 140 of 1916, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8321].
156. See Gulf Refining Co. v. Tillinghast, 152 La. 847, 94 So. 418 (1922).
157. With regard to the rolling stock of the special car lines idle car al-
lowance is granted to the extent of twenty per cent. of the total units oper-
ated when tank cars fail to earn as much as one hundred miles per car per
day and when refrigerator cars do not earn as much as one hundred fifty
miles per car per day. As to other specially made equipment allowance is
granted on the merits of each case. See discussion supra p. 543 with regard to
arbitrary depreciation.
158. Cf. supra note 140. This statement was issued by the Louisiana Tax
Commission especially with regard to the rolling stock of the special car
lines operating in Louisiana.
159. See supra note 79.
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be railroads in the generic sense or the tank car line companies
engaged in the business of carriage, have been chartered by other
states.
Under the verbiage of this section the state and federal courts
have not seen eye to eye in the interpretation to be given the
"domicile or principal office" of such a foreign railroad business.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has apparently taken it for
granted that the appointment of an agent for service of process is
tantamount to a declaration of domicile in the state, and hence
the rolling stock may be assessed and taxed at the domicile. 16 0 A
federal district court decision stated that it was bound by this
holding, but was reversed by the circuit court on the theory that
the appointment of a local agent for the purpose of receiving serv-
ice, as required by law,16' is not an establishment of domicil to
authorize the assessment and taxation of its rolling stock by the
parish and municipal authorities; but that such rolling stock is
assessable and taxable only by the Tax Commission for state pur-
poses under Article X, Section 16 of the Constitution of 1921.1"2
This latter decision attempted to distinguish those state decisions,
which in effect were contra to its ruling. Subsequent federal de-
cisions involving Act 109 of 1921 (Extraordinary Session) which
is predicated upon Article X, Section 16, of the Constitution of
1921, have held this statute to be constitutional; that the purpose
and effect of the act was to subject the rolling stock of foreign
companies within Louisiana to state taxation; that the act refers
specifically to owners of rolling stock who have no domicile in
Louisiana. 163 In brief, then, the federal view on this problem is
to the effect that rolling stock of non-resident, non-domiciled own-
ers, is subject to state taxation for state purposes, and the assign-
ment of the Parish of East Baton Rouge as the parish in which
160. White Oil Corporation v. Flanagan, 153 La. 837, 96 So. 675 (1923);
Simms Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 155 La. 565, 99 So. 450 (1924). But see Union Tank
Line-Co. v. Day, Sheriff, 143 La. 771, 79 So. 334 (1918), Constantin Refining Co.
v. Day, 147 La. 623, 85 So. 613 (1920) which was overruled by Gulf Refining
Co. v. Tillinghast, 152 La. 847, 94 So. 418 (1922). See also Opinions of Attor-
ney General (1934-1936) 1306.
161. Simms Oil Co. v. Wolfe, 6 F. (2d) 504 (C.C.A. 5th, 1925).
162. Accord: Day v. Simms Oil Co. interpreting Act 109 of 1921 (E.S.)
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8292-8300] in 23 F. (2d) 923 (W.D. La. 1927), affirmed,
31 Fed. (2d) 507 (C.C.A. 5th, 1929). Cert. denied 279 U.S. 874, 49 S. Ct. 514, 73
L.Ed. 1009 (1929).
163. General American Tank Car Corporation v. Day, Sheriff, & Ex-officlo
Tax Collector, 270 U.S. 367, 46 S.Ct. 235, 70 L.Ed. 635 (1926); Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Day, 11 F. (2d) 664 (E.D. La. 1926). Accord: Union Tank Car Co. v.
Day, Sheriff, 156 La. 1071, 101 So. 581 (1924).
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the taxes are collected for state purposes is permissible under the
constitution of the state.
There is still uncertainty on the part of the writer as to the
law which governs in this kind of situation. As we said previ-
ously, the effect of the state decision is that the appointment of
an agent effectuates a declaration of domicile under Act 9 of 1917
(Extraordinary Session), which was declared by Act 109 of 1921
(Extraordinary Session) to be in full force and effect where not
inconsistent with the latter act. But under the federal circuit
court decision, cited above, there is no domicil whatever where
only an agent for service of process has been appointed.
Although it would seem the federal viewpoint is sound, the
administrative authorities apparently assume that there is a split
of authority on the problem, and prefer to abide by the state "de-
cision" on the matter. So your writer has been told that for the
past twenty years the authority to levy taxes upon the assessed
value of such rolling stock has been accorded those local units of
government which have been "declared" by the owners to be
their domiciles-effectuated by simply appointing agents to re-
ceive process. Some of the consequences of such a procedure are
at once amazing and inequitable. In most instances, parishes with
low rates of levy or low valuations are selected as "domiciles,"
and more than frequently the agent appointed for service of pro-
cess actually resides elsewhere.
A further consideration of Section 29 of Act 170 of 1898164
discloses that jurisdiction to tax the real estate, road beds, roads,
super-structures, et cetera, of railroads, canals, other transporta-
tion, telephone and telegraph companies belongs to the parish or
assessment district where such property is located. The theory of
property acquiring a taxable situs where located or operated is
made applicable to ferry boats, tugs, vehicles of all kinds, et
cetera, going between two or more parishes, with a division of
taxable values among the two or several parishes, as the case may
be. However, a great portion of this section is now obsolete by
reason of the exemptions accorded gasoline driven vehicles and
boats.16 5 And in one instance we find authority in an opinion by
the Attorney General to the effect that water-craft belonging to a
transportation company are assessed at the domicile of the com-
pany, though the property be located in another parish. 66 The
164. See supra note 79.
165. Supra note 152.
166. Opinions of Attorney General (1936-1938) 1092.
[Vol. IV
1942] PUBLIC UTILITY PROPERTY ASSESSMENT 551
spurious basis for such an opinion was apparently the fact that
the property was not in use at the time, although the language of
the statute does not recognize that factor. However, in effect, the
Attorney General has rebutted the reasoning of Gulf Refining
Company v. Tillinghast,17 which stated that movable property
permanently within the state but moving constantly from place to
place, is assessable at the domicil of the owner where there are
no statutes to the contrary.
The writer mentioned previously the fact that there has been
no reported litigation to date on issues that might be raised in
interpreting the 1932 amendments to Section 29 of Act 170 of 1898.
This does not mean that the statute with clarity points the way
to satisfactory apportionment or allocation of the property listed
in this section. In fact the antithesis is the reality of the situation.
For instance, it would seem that the taxpayers have no authority
to apportion their property to the various local governments by
way of the annual reports; but that this power of allocation should
belong to the Tax Commission alone. Yet, in most of the annual
reports required of the so-called utilities provision is made where-
by the taxpayer allocates or apportions the property"" and unless
the local authorities object, for one reason or another, the word
of the taxpayer is accorded finality in specifying which of the
local governments, as listed, are entitled to levy and collect taxes
upon the assessed property.
This discussion then has lead us into the final phase of this
paper-the system of certification and apportionment or alloca-
tion of the assessments to the various local assessors so that state
and local taxes may be levied. After meeting in April, as pro-
vided by law, for the purpose of assessing for taxation the prop-
erty belonging to the so-called utilities, the Tax Commission by
means of certificates of assessment, returns to the local assessors
the valuations and assessments of the property."" These certifi-
cates, as they are called, in the final analysis, are the evidences of
the values and the-results of the apportionment of the property
among the various local units of government. If the taxpayer
seeks a reduction in assessment, suit must be brought on or before
the first Monday of November of the year in which the assess-
167. Supra note 156.
168. The forms or schedules for the return of property to the Commis-
sion require the utilities to list property by parishes and municipalities.
169. Louisiana Tax Commission, Assessment Suggestions to Assessors
and Polce Juries (1942) 29.
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ment is made, else the assessment is deemed final.17 Such a suit
must be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction in the Parish
of East Baton Rouge.17' But where the taxpayer complains that
the assessment is null, no time limit is set for the institution of
suit, nor must it be brought in the Parish of East Baton Rouge,
the domiciliary' parish of the Commission (or its predecessors).17
Whatever the reason for contesting the assessment, the burden is
on the taxpayer to overcome the presumption that the assessment
is a valid one.178
By Act 120 of 1918 the State Board of Appraisers, the prede-
cessors to the Tax Commission, was vested with the power to
correct or change the assessment of any public service corporation
or other property owner where the assessment was made directly
by the Board.'7 In Act 18 of the Second Extraordinary Session of
1934 this authority to change and correct assessments was ex-
tended to any and all assessments of property, "in order to make
said assessments conform to the true and correct valuations." 75
The statute provides that such change or correction may be made
by the Commission at any time before actual payment of the
taxes. Too, it provides that notice must be given the taxpayer
where an increase in assessment is made, so that he may exercise
his right to contest the correctness of the change, as provided by
the statute.' 8 This 1934 act had a repealing clause, so that the
provisions of Act 120 of 1918 are superseded.
Assuming that the assessment of the property belonging to
any one of the so-called utilities is uncontested, the final step,
then, in the assessment process is the spreading of the valuations,
as evidenced by the certificates of assessment, on the assessment
rolls by the local parish assessor, so that state and local taxes may
be levied and collected, according to law.
CONCLUSION
It has been the purpose of this paper to describe, both from
170. La. Act 122 of 1900, § 7; La. Act 70 of 1904, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
83271. But see Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Aucoin, 140 La. 768,
73 So. 859 (1917).
171. Supra note 169.
172. New Orleans Great Northern Railway Co. v. Thomas, Assessor, 129
La. 128, 55 So. 737 (1911). See Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co. v. Coverdale,
181 La. 117, 158 So. 640 (1935).
173. Supra note 129.
174. See Southern Amusement Co. v. City of Jennings, 180 La. 800, 157 So.
720 (1934).
175. See supra note 11.
176. There was no provision for the giving of notice in La. Act 120 of 1918
[Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 84198422].
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administrative and legal viewpoints, the present situation in the
field of assessment for purposes of ad valorem property taxation
of the so-called public utilities in the state. The writer is not con-
cerned by the thought that she has left the reader confused and
perplexed, for certainly such is the status of the law of Louisiana
in the field of ad valorem property assessment of "public utilities."
For years the general property tax has been under attack in
this country. Many theoretical solutions and substitutional sys-
tems have been suggested, but it seems that this kind of system,
whatever its faults, is still predominant throughout these United
States. If the general property tax is to be continued in this state
as to public utilities, the administrative authorities are in accord
that the obsolete statutes should be eliminated in a careful revi-
sion and the writer suggests that the actual administration of the
system should then be made to conform more closely to the posi-
tive law.
